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SUMMARY 
Recent corporate scandals suggest a breakdown in internal controls and the lack 
of adequate corporate governance mechanisms.  In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which requires firms to assess internal controls and report internal control 
weaknesses.  My study examines the causes and consequences of material weaknesses 
(MW) reported under Section 302 of SOX.  The study has four main objectives.  First, I 
investigate whether firms that report MW are associated with less effective audit 
committees and boards of directors.  Using 184 firms that reported MW from August 
2003 to December 2004 and a matched-pair sample of control firms, I find that firms with 
lower audit committee financial expertise, smaller audit committees, and lower board 
independence are more likely to have MW. Second, I examine whether the managerial 
labor market imposes penalties on top management, audit committees, and boards of 
directors for internal control failures.  I find that MW firms have significantly higher 
turnover of their audit committee members and outside directors than the control firms 
following the MW detection.  Audit committee members and outside directors in the MW 
firms also lose more outside directorships than their counterparts in the control firms. 
There is some empirical support that the top management in the MW firms is more likely 
to leave the firm than their counterparts in the control firms.  Additional analyses show 
that the extent of reputational penalties increase with the severity of the MW detected.  
Third, I examine whether the MW firms improve their governance structures upon the 
MW detection.  The results indicate that MW firms exp rience greater improvement in 
their governance structures than the control firms.  By the second year following the MW 
detection, the MW and control firms no longer differ in terms of audit committee 
 xi   
independence, audit committee financial expertise, audit committee size, and board 
independence.  Last, I examine whether the market reacts posi ively to the improvement 
in governance structures.  I find a positive relation betwen the two-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns and the MW firms’ improvement in audit committee size and board 
independence.  This result is consistent with the improvement in governance structures 









 Recent corporate scandals have suggested a breakdown in internal controls and 
the lack of adequate corporate governance mechanisms.  In an attempt to restore public 
confidence in financial reporting, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) in October 2002.  The Act has been widely considered as the most important 
corporate reform since the 1930s, and includes widespread provisions targeting corporate 
internal controls, firms’ corporate governance structures, and nonaudit services provided 
by external auditors, to name a few.  Perhaps one of the most controversial provisions of 
SOX is the internal-controls reporting requirements under SOX 302 and SOX 404.  The 
arguments raised center around the costs and benefits of thi provision.   
 
SOX 404 requires management to acknowledge its responsibility for establishing 
and maintaining adequate internal controls, including asserting their effectiveness in 
writing.1  The auditor associated with the financial statements in turn must attest to 
management’s assertion about the effectiveness of internal controls and give an opinion 
on the effectiveness of the internal controls (SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986).  
In addition, SOX 302 requires that management evaluate the effectiveness of disclosure 
                                               
 
 
1 An accelerated filer (a U.S. company with market capitalization over $75 million that has filed at least one 
annual report with the SEC) was required to comply with the SOX 404 requirements for its first fiscal year 
ending on or after November 15, 2004.  A non-accelerated filer, including a foreign private issuer, must 
begin to comply for its first fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2007.  
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and control procedures, report results of the evaluation, and indicate any “significant 
changes” in internal control since the last Form 10-K or Form 10-Q filed (SEC Release 
Nos. 33-8124 and 34-46427).  
 
Underlying the internal-controls reporting requirements is he belief that strong 
internal controls help ensure the credibility of financial reporting and restore investor 
confidence in financial reporting.  The assumption that internal control deficiencies lead 
to fraudulent financial reporting is supported by anecdotal evidence.  In 1999, the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 
commissioned a study and reasserted that a poor internal control environment contributed 
to the occurrences of fraud documented over the ten year time frame 1987-1997, 
consistent with the fraud surveys conducted by KPMG.  SEC Chairman Issac Hunt Jr., in 
his speech in 1999, also noted that ‘internal control deficiencies were undermining the 
financial reporting system.” (Hunt 1999).  Given the importance of internal controls over 
financial reporting, it is important to understand what mechanisms ensure effective 
internal controls (Krishnan 2005) and the consequences of the internal-controls reporting 
requirements.  
 
The first objective of this study is to examine the relation between firms’ 
governance structures and internal control quality.  Within large corporations, agency 
problems arise due to the separation of ownership and control.  One way the audit 
committee and the board of directors resolve agency problems is through superior 
oversight and monitoring of internal controls.  Hence, I hypothesize a positive relation 
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between the effectiveness of the audit committee and board of directors, and the quality 
of the firm’s internal controls.  Because the incidence of material weaknesses (MW) is a 
reflection of lower quality internal controls, I expect the effectiveness of the audit 
committee and the board to be negatively related to the incidence of MW.   
 
I measure the effectiveness of the audit committee by its independence, financial 
expertise, size, and diligence.  The effectiveness of the board is measured by its 
independence, size, diligence, and the duality of its CEO and Chairman positions.  I use 
Compliance Week, AuditAnalytics, and the sample firms in Doyle et al. (2007a) to 
identify firms that disclosed at least one MW from theperiod August 2003 to December 
2004.  These MW firms are then matched to a sample of control firms without internal 
control problems based on size, industry, exchange listing, and accelerated-filer status.  A 
logistic regression model is then used to test the relation between the effectiveness of the 
audit committee and board, and the incidence of MW.  
 
The regression results are consistent with my expectations.  I find that in the year 
prior to the MW detection, firms with less effective audit committees and boards are 
more likely to have MW.  Specifically, firms with a lower proportion of audit committee 
members with accounting financial expertise,2 smaller audit committees, and a lower 
proportion of board members who are independent, are more likely to be related to the 
incidence of MW.  There is also some empirical support that firms with a lower 
                                               
 
 
2 Accounting financial expertise refers to experience as a public accountant, auditor, principal or chief 
financial officer, controller, or chief accounting officer.     
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proportion of audit committee members with nonaccounting financial expertise3 are more 
likely to have MW.  These results are consistent with the interpretation that both the audit 
committee and the board play an important role in the monitoring of internal controls.    
 
The second objective of this study is to examine whether there are reputational 
penalties imposed on top individuals, i.e. top management, audit committee members, 
and outside directors on the board, when monitoring of internal controls fails.   If so, 
disciplinary actions can provide strong ex-ante incentivs for these individuals to be 
effective monitors.  Empirical evidence provides support that such disciplinary actions 
are effective when poor financial performance or fraud ensu s (Desai et al. 2006, Warner 
et al. 1988), but there has been no research examining the penalties related to weak 
internal controls.  This study fills this void by examining whether these top individuals 
face reputational penalties upon MW detection.   
 
The empirical results are consistent with top management, audit committees, and 
outside directors facing reputational penalties upon MW detection.  Specifically, I find 
that the audit committee members and outside directors in the MW firms experience 
turnover at a rate greater than their counterparts in the control firms.  This result is robust 
even after controlling for other factors that may affect the turnover of these individuals, 
                                               
 
 
3 Nonaccounting financial expertise refers to the experience as a CEO, president, general partner, or 
managing director of a for-profit corporation.  The definitio  of “financial expertise” in the earlier version 
of SOX included only the formal definition of expertise, but the final version of SOX was expanded to 
include both definitions.  A detailed discussion on the financial expertise of the audit committee can be 
found in Chapter 4.1.1 of this study. 
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such as poor financial performance.  I also find that audit committee members and 
outside directors of the MW firms lose more outside dir ctorships in other public 
companies than their counterparts in the control firms.  This result is consistent with the 
labor market inferring the lower quality in monitoring associated with these individuals 
and imposing further reputational penalties as a result.  There is also some empirical 
support that the top management in the MW firms is more likely to leave the firm than 
their counterparts in the control firms.  Last, furthe tests show that the turnover of audit 
committee members and outside directors, and the loss in their outside directorships, 
increase with the severity of the MW detected.  Overall, the results provide empirical 
support for the labor market penalties associated with internal control failures. 
 
Firms may perfunctorily change their top individuals to recover lost reputational 
capital or to limit the liabilities that arise from these internal control weaknesses.  Merely 
replacing an ineffective manager or director with another in ffective individual will not 
result in an overall improvement in firms’ governance structures.  Hence, the third 
objective of this study is to examine whether MW firms i prove their corporate 
governance structures upon detection of such weaknesses.   Examining whether the 
governance structures for these firms improve is important, given that these firms are 
more susceptible to frauds and/or financial statement errors, and are of much concern to 
regulators and the investing public.  Improvement in governance structures can also be 
seen as tangible benefits accruing to stakeholders of weak firms that can potentially 
justify the high costs involved in the internal-controls reporting requirements of SOX.  
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The empirical results show that while both the MW firms and control firms 
improve their governance structures from the year prior to the MW detection to the 
second year following the MW detection, the MW firms show more improvement in their 
audit committee independence, audit committee accounting financ al expertise, audit 
committee size, and board independence.  Using a composite measure to capture the 
overall improvement in governance structures, I also find that the MW firms show greater 
overall improvement in the effectiveness of their audit committees and boards than the 
control firms.  In fact, in the second year following the MW detection, the MW firms and 
control firms no longer exhibit differences in their audit committee independence, audit 
committee accounting financial expertise, audit committee siz , and board independence.  
These results are consistent with the MW firms’ attempts to restore investor confidence, 
reestablish reputational capital, recover stock performance, etc., through the improvement 
of their governance structures.    
 
The last objective of this study is to examine whether for the MW firms, the 
improvement in corporate governance structures are capitalized in long-run buy-and-hold 
returns.  Existing studies have shown that firms with in ernal control weaknesses suffer a 
short-term decline in stock price or increase in cost of capital, suggesting that market 
participants discount the credibility of financial reports of these firms.  If investors indeed 
perceive the improvement in governance structures as resulting in better monitoring by 
the audit committee and the board, they are likely to have greater confidence in the firm’s 
financial reporting and react positively to the improvement in governance structures.  
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Given this, we can expect a reversal of long-run stock pri e reaction for firms that 
improve their governance structures.   
 
The empirical results are consistent with this expectation.  Specifically, among the 
sample of MW firms, I find a positive relation between the improvement in audit 
committee size and board independence, and the two-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns.  Hence, the market reacts as if they believe that the increases in audit committee 
size and board independence in the MW firms improve the firms’ financial reporting 
quality.  This evidence provides empirical support that the internal-controls reporting 
requirements help to restore investor confidence in firms’ financial reporting, which is 
fundamental to maintaining the stability of the capital m rket as a whole. 
 
The rest of this study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides the background 
to the internal-controls reporting requirements and the related literature on internal 
control reporting.  Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses, and Chapter 4 discusses the 
research design and the sample used in the study.  Chapter 5 presents the empirical 








BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH 
 
2.1 Institutional Background and Reporting Environment 
 Even before SOX had been passed, the SEC, Congress, and private sector 
organizations such as the Financial Executives Institute (FEI) and the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) recommended mandatory management internal control reports as a means 
to improve the reliability of financial statements.  The SEC attempted to obtain approval 
in 1978 and 1991 that would have required mandatory internal control reports by all 
public companies, but met with little success.  Furthermore, some public and private 
sector groups also recommended auditor attestation on management internal control 
reports, but failed prior to SOX.  
 
Although there has not been a mandatory requirement for internal control 
reporting prior to SOX, two important documents have been issued that provide 
guidance.  First, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) (1992) issued Internal Control – Integratd Framework, which 
provides a high-level overview of the internal control famework to guide chief executive 
and other senior executives, board members, legislators nd regulators.  It defines internal 
control as a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives in the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial 
reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations.  Thereport also provides guidance 
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to those entities that report publicly on internal control over preparation of their published 
financial statements, or are contemplating doing so, and provides materials that may be 
useful in conducting an evaluation of an internal control system.   
 
One year later in 1993, the Auditing Standards Board issued Statements on 
Standards for Attestation Engagement (SSAE) No.2, Reporting on an Entity’s Internal 
Control Structure over Financial Reporting.  Similar to COSO, SSAE No. 2 restricts its 
scope to reporting on internal control over financial reporting.  SSAE also provides 
guidance on the definition of internal controls and the types of auditor reports that may be 
issued based on the auditor’s examination of the internal co trol structure.   
 
The downfalls of Enron and Arthur Andersen, and the Worldcm saga provided 
the impetus for more stringent requirements on internal control disclosure and reporting.  
According to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the series of 
corporate scandals that began with Enron in late 2001 exposd serious weakness in the 
system of checks and balances.  Such checks and balances are fundamental to protecting 
the interests of shareholders, pension beneficiaries, and employees of public companies, 
and to protecting the confidence of the American public in the s ability of U.S. capital 
markets.  The Congress subsequently responded to the corporate failures with SOX of 
2002.  The Act created a broad and new oversight regime for auditors of public 
companies while prescribing steps to address specific failures and codifying the 
responsibilities of corporate executives, corporate dir ctors, lawyers and accountants.  
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Failures in internal control, particularly over financial reporting, were among the specific 
concerns addressed by Congress in SOX. 
 
Specifically, SOX 404 requires not only that management report on a company’s 
internal control over financial reporting, but also that auditors attest to the accuracy of 
management’s report and provide their own opinion on the internal controls.  This 
provision is generally effective for fiscal years ending o or after June 15, 2004, but the 
date was subsequently postponed to November 15, 2004.  In addition, SOX 302 requires 
that management evaluate the effectiveness of disclosure and control procedures, report 
results of the evaluation, and indicate any “significant changes” in internal control since 
the last Form 10-K or Form 10-Q filed (SEC Release Nos. 33-8124 and 34-46427).  
 
The bottom line for Congress, and for the PCAOB, is the reliability of the 
company’s financial statements – statements that are relied on by shareholders, 
employees, directors, regulators, lenders, investors and the market at large.  The Congress 
and PCAOB both hold the view that good internal controls are necessary to achieve 
reliability of financial statements.  Investors can hve much more confidence in the 
reliability of financial statements if management demonstrates that it exercises adequate 
internal control over accounting, maintains sufficient records for the preparation of 
accurate financial statements, adheres to rules about the se of company assets and takes 





2.2 Early Research on Internal Controls 
Despite the importance of internal controls, relatively little empirical research has 
been conducted on internal controls prior to the passage of SOX.  One reason could be 
due to the fact that reports on internal controls were not widely provided by firms, 
limiting research in this area.  Reports on internal controls were generally issued on a 
voluntary basis (Hermanson 2000).  An exception is where firms were required to 
disclose any internal control problems around auditor changes, if in the prior two years 
internal control problems were one of the “reportable ev nts.”  
 
One earlier study by Wallace (1981) examines the internal control reporting 
practices of municipalities and finds that disclosures of these entities did not answer 
questions of risk exposure, costs and benefits, or the meaning of the diversity of report 
forms.  Raghunandan and Rama (1994) examine the 1993 annual reports of F tune 100 
companies and find that 80 companies had management reports mentioning the existence 
of internal controls.  Only six of these companies discus ed the effectiveness of the 
internal controls.  McMullen et al. (1996) compare the propo tion of companies with 
financial reporting problems that have a management report on internal control (MRIC) 
to the National Automated Accounting Research System (NAARS) population of 
companies with MRICs.  The study finds that smaller companies w th financial reporting 
problems are less likely to have MRICs than the population of small companies in the 
NAARS database.  This result implies that voluntary issuance of MRIC could be 
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perceived by users as a signal that management has reviewed the internal controls 
thoroughly.  
 
Hermanson (2000) surveys nine different financial statement user groups to 
analyze the demand for reporting on internal control.  The results of the study show that 
all user groups feel that internal control reporting is important and that voluntary MRICs 
improve controls and provide additional information beyond the audited financial 
statements.  However, respondents do not feel as strongly about the informational content 
of mandatory MRICs.  McMullen and O’Reilly-Allen (2002) ext nd the study of 
Hermanson (2000) to determine if management and auditor reporting n internal control 
affect the perceived reliability of the financial statements.  In their study, participants are 
given a case study and then asked to respond to a series of questions, which examine their 
perceptions of the financial statement reliability.  The results of the study indicate that 
users’ perceptions do not appear to be affected by the inclusion of an MRIC or Auditor 
Report on Internal Control (ARIC).  However, as highlted by the authors, because the 
study consists of a case study, there are limitations on the external validity of these 
results.  
 
2.3 Recent Research on Internal Controls 
The series of corporate scandals has exposed weaknesses in ch cks and balances 
that were intended to protect the public’s interests.  The passage of SOX further 
highlights the attention regulators give toward internal controls as a means to improve 
financial reporting and regain the public’s confidence.  These emphases on internal 
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controls have generated much research, specifically on the characteristics of firms with 
weak internal controls and the consequences of weak internal controls.  Because this 
study focuses on examining whether corporate governance structures are associated with 
weak internal controls, and how the revelation of weak internal controls affect firms’ 
governance structures, I review existing studies that are related to this study.    
One stream of research examines whether firms that report internal control problems 
subsequent to the passing of SOX are associated with certain firm characteristics 
(Ashbaugh et al. 2007, Ge and McVay 2005, Bryan and Lilien 2005, Doyle et al. 2007a).  
The underlying assumptions are that certain characteristics could result in internal control 
weaknesses.  Ge and McVay (2005) focus on a sample of 145 companies that have 
disclosed MW in internal control in their 10-K filings after the effective date of SOX.  
The authors find that poor internal controls are usually associated with inadequate 
accounting resources and that disclosing MW is positively associated with the complexity 
of the firm, and negatively associated with the age and profitability of the firm.  Bryan 
and Lilien (2005) also find that firms with MW are both smaller and worse performers 
than their matched industry counterparts.  Consistent with these two studies, Doyle et al. 
(2007a) find that MW are more likely for firms that are smaller, less profitable, more 
complex, growing rapidly, or undergoing restructuring.  Theauthors conclude that these 
findings are consistent with firms struggling with their financial reporting controls in the 




Last, Ashbaugh et al. (2007) find that firms making pre-SOX 404 internal control 
deficiency disclosures typically have more complex operations, recent changes in 
organization structure, more accounting risk exposure, fewer resources to invest in 
internal control and a higher incidence of auditor resignation relative to firms that do not 
report internal control problems.  The study also investigates firms’ incentives to discover 
and report internal control problems, and finds that firms that have internal control 
deficiencies have more prior SEC enforcement actions and restatements of financial 
statements, are more likely to use a dominant audit firm, and are more likely to have 
concentrated institutional ownership.  This study differs rom these studies in that it 
examines the link between weak internal controls and governance structures.  
 
Another stream of research looks at whether internal controls are associated with 
firms’ earnings quality.  Doyle et al. (2007b) examine the relation between accruals 
quality and internal controls using a sample of 653 firms that disclosed at least one MW 
from August 2002 to November 2005.  The study finds that firms with MW tend to have 
lower accruals quality, as measured by the extent to which ac ruals are realized as cash 
flows.  In addition, accruals quality is especially poor for those MW that relate to overall 
company-level controls, which may be more difficult to “audit around.”  These results are 
robust to four additional accruals quality measures: discretionary accruals, earnings 
persistence, average accruals quality, and historical accounting restatements.  The authors 
conclude that internal control appears to be an underlying, fu damental driver of accruals 




Ashbaugh et al. (2006a) investigate both the effect of internal control deficiencies 
and their remediation on accrual quality.  The authors dcument that, relative to firms not 
reporting internal control deficiencies, firms that report internal control deficiencies have 
lower quality accruals.  Further, firms that report, and their auditors confirm, remediation 
of previously reported deficiencies exhibit an increase in accrual quality, while those 
firms that fail to remediate deficiencies continue to exhibit poorer accrual quality relative 
to non-deficiency firms.  The authors conclude that consistent with assertions by market 
regulators, strong internal controls have significant effects on the reliability of financial 
reporting.  This study complements the above studies by examining how internal control 
weaknesses affect the governance structures of the firms with these weaknesses.  
 
The last major stream of research examines the consequences of internal control 
weaknesses by examining the market’s reaction to disclosure f th se weaknesses.  These 
studies produce mixed results.  Whisenant et al. (2003) investigate he information 
content of reportable events communicated by auditors in Form 8-K filings, including 
those identifying internal control deficiencies, and find that disclosures of control 
deficiencies have no negative stock price reaction.  In contrast, Hammersley et al. (2006) 
examine the market's price and volume reactions to management's disclosure of internal 
control weaknesses and to their characteristics.  The study finds that returns are 
significantly negative when MW are disclosed, and more negative when management 
claims that the control system is effective, despite the presence of a MW.  The study also 
finds increased trading volume when internal control weaknsses are disclosed.  The 
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authors conclude that the results suggest that these disclosures provide information to 
market participants.  Specifically, returns results are consistent with investor concerns 
about the expense necessary to remediate weaknesses or th  p ssibility that uncorrected 
errors remain in the financial statements.  Trading volume results suggest that disclosure 
of an internal control weakness generates investor disagreement about the firm's future 
prospects.  
 
Emanuels et al. (2006) also examine market returns around the disclosure of 
internal control problems by public firms.  Using all companies reporting deficiencies or 
weaknesses in the internal controls for the period November 2003 up to December 2004, 
they find that there are significant negative abnormal returns in the period prior to the 
disclosure event and that these returns around and subsequent to the disclosure are much 
smaller.  Partitioning the sample of firms, they find that problems related to staffing 
issues have no significant effect on stock returns in the post event window, i.e. after the 
disclosure.  Problems related to financial reporting complexity lead to a significant 
decrease of the average abnormal returns in the post-event window.  Last, Beniesh et al. 
(2006) also find that firms disclosing internal control weaknesses experience negative 
abnormal returns of -1.8 percent in the three days surrounding disclosure.  
 
Instead of examining market reaction, a few studies examine whether disclosures 
of internal control weaknesses cause the market to assign a higher cost of capital to the 
firm.  Ashbaugh et al. (2006b) use unaudited pre-SOX 404 disclosures and SOX 404 
audit opinions to assess how changes in internal control quality affect risk and the cost of 
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equity capital.  After controlling for other risk factors, the authors find that firms with 
internal control deficiencies have significantly higher cost of equity capital.  However, 
they document that the remediation of an internal control deficiency is followed by a 
significant reduction in the cost of equity capital (ranging from 50 to 150 basis points) 
depending on the analysis.  
 
Ogneva et al. (2006) examine the association between implied cost of equity and 
internal control effectiveness for firms that filed SOX 404 reports with the SEC and also 
for firms that disclosed internal control problems under SOX 302.  They find marginally 
higher cost of equity for firms disclosing MW in internal controls than for a sample of 
control firms disclosing no MW.  However, the differenc s in cost of equity disappear 
after controlling for other economic characteristics as ociated with firms disclosing MW.  
The authors also find evidence that the costs of equity are significantly higher for a small 
sample of firms that delayed their SOX 404 disclosures.  Last, Beneish et al. (2006) find 
support for the belief that firms with internal control weaknesses are perceived to have 
lower credibility in financial reporting.  Specifically, the authors find that the costs of 
capital of these firms increased on average by 4.4 percent, when compared to three 
alternative control samples matched on industry and either size, performance, or an 
earnings quality measure.   
 
This line of research examines the first order effect of internal control weaknesses 
on the market’s reaction.  This study seeks to complement th se studies by examining the 
second order effect of internal control weaknesses on the capital market’s reaction.  
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Specifically, the study examines how internal control weaknesses affect corporate 





3.1 Relation between Internal Control Quality and Corporate Governance Structure 
3.1.1 Monitoring of Internal Controls by the Board of Directors 
The findings that weak internal controls result in lower accruals quality and 
negative stock market reaction lend support to the regulators’ emphasis on internal 
controls to improve financial reporting quality.  Weak inter al controls, especially if 
disclosed and allowed to persist, can undermine users’ perception of the credibility of the 
firm’s financial reporting and harm the firm in the long run.  Despite the importance of 
internal controls, research on what corporate governance mechanisms can ensure 
effective internal controls is scant.  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that boards assume an important role in 
corporate governance.  The modern large corporation is characterized by the absence of 
the classical entrepreneurial decision maker.  Instead, in order to reap the benefits of risk 
sharing, the company’s residual claims are diffused among may investors, who 
generally vest their decision rights in individuals with specialized knowledge.   Agency 
theory predicts that such delegation of decision to management creates conflicts of 
interests between managers and residual claimants.  Agency costs are created because the 
managers who initiate and implement important decisions are not the major residual 
claimants and therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions.  
Without effective control procedures, such managers are likely to take actions that 
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deviate from the interests of residual claimants.  For instance, managers can manipulate 
financial reports or commit fraud to maximize their own self-interests, and to the 
detriment of shareholders. 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that agency costs can be reduced by institutional 
arrangements that separate decision management from decision control.  Separate 
decision control is required to monitor the actions of the top managers, i.e. CEO or 
president, approving the corporation’s strategy, and monitoring the control systems of the 
firms.   Within the large corporations, decision control rights are delegated to the board, 
which represents the highest level of decision control.  The board helps to reduce 
conflicts of interests between managers and residual claimants and ensure that 
management decisions are congruent with shareholders’ interest.   
 
Effective internal controls are part of the firm’s overall control system that can be 
used to mitigate agency conflicts and curb managers’ opportunistic behavior (Jensen and 
Payne 2003).   A sound financial reporting system prevents managers from using 
aggressive accounting to inflate earnings and/or stock price, and effective internal 
controls are essential in ensuring the integrity of financial reporting system.   For 
instance, the maintenance of proper accounting policies and procedures and adequate 
controls over non-routine transactions reduce ambiguities in the interpretation of 
accounting procedures.  In turn, this can prevent managers from manipulating accounting 
rules to maximize their self-interests.  Proper internal controls over financial statement 
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closing procedures, timely preparation of account reconciliations, and account analysis all 
seek to reduce errors in financial accounting, thus ensuring accurate financial reporting.   
 
Effective internal controls such as the hiring of accounting personnel with high 
levels of accounting expertise and technical competence with financial accounting 
standards or SEC filing requirements can enhance the quality of accounting information 
(Jensen and Payne 2003).   For instance, accounting personnel with high levels of 
accounting expertise are more likely to capture and report relevant financial information 
useful for decision making and prepare financial statements in conformance with 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for external parties.  Highly competent 
and/or experienced accounting personnel are also better able to understand complex 
accounting issues and deal with non-routine accounting trasactions.     
 
Another important internal control that curbs managers’ opportunistic behavior is 
the internal audit function.  Many of the responsibilities of internal auditors are linked 
directly to the production and monitoring of accounting information.  One of them is to 
test, evaluate, and make recommendations regarding an organization’s accounting system 
and internal controls over financial reporting.  By doing so, internal auditors reduce the 
risk of fraud and protect assets from theft or loss, thus ensuring that accounting 
information generated by the firm is less susceptible to errors.    
 
The above discussions highlight the importance of internal controls as a 
monitoring mechanism that the board uses to reduce agency coflicts and managers’ 
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opportunistic behavior.   Reputational concerns provide additional ncentives for the 
board of directors to play a vigilant role in the monitoring of internal controls.  Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that outside directors are gene ally high-
reputation members of the business community who view the directorate as a means of 
further developing their reputations as experts in decision control.   Directors who 
demonstrate their superior ability in decision control are rewarded through additional 
directorships and prestige.  Hence, directors have incentives either to protect or enhance 
their reputational capital.  Because weak internal controls are likely to result in lower 
financial reporting quality (Ashbaugh et al. 2006a, Doyle et al. 2007b) and harm the 
directors’ reputation, the board is likely to play a vigilant role in the monitoring of 
internal controls and financial reporting. 
 
3.1.2 Monitoring of Internal Controls by the Audit Committee 
It is common for the board to delegate duties to a subset of the board.  The extant 
literature suggests that the board faces litigation risks for monitoring failures and that 
directors can mitigate their liability through formation f an effective audit committee.  
Reinstein et al. (1984) posit that outside non-audit committee directors may be able to 
demonstrate fulfillment of their fiduciary duties by stating that they relied upon audit 
committee representations on issues regarding the adequacy of the firm’s financial 
reporting and the audit committee’s relationship with the ext rnal auditors.   As such, 
non-audit committee directors effectively shift some of the risk of potential financial 
misstatement to the audit committee (Abbott et al. 2003).  Consequently, audit 
committees would seek to mitigate risk by diligently performing oversight of the firm’s 
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accounting functions.  Studies with findings consistent withthe quality of the audit 
committee being associated with financial reporting outcomes include Carcello and Neal 
(2003a) and Klein (2002b).  Because internal controls over financial reporting might 
affect financial reporting outcomes, it is expected thatmore effective audit committees 
will seek to produce favorable financial reporting outcomes by maintaining effective 
internal controls. 
 
Further, the profession and regulators are both of the view that one of the duties of 
the audit committee should be to ensure effective internal controls.  The Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999) 
recommends that the audit committee encourage procedures that promote accountability 
and ensure that management properly develops and adheres to a sound system of internal 
control.   The Commission on Public Trust (2003) advocates the requirements of SOX 
that “….the audit committee be responsible for the appointment, compensation, and 
oversight of the work of the auditors, and that the outside auditors and internal auditors 
report directly to the audit committee.”   Under SOX 301, audit committees of public 
companies are required to establish procedures for the “receipt, retention, and treatment 
of complaints” regarding accounting, internal controls, and auditing.   
 
The importance of the audit committee’s role in the oversight of the firm’s 
internal control system has also been highlighted by researchers.  DeZoort (1997) surveys 
audit committee members to elicit perceptions of their responsibilities in areas related to 
financial reporting, auditing, and overall corporate governance.  Members consistently 
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rank internal control evaluation as the most important oversight area, with financial 
statement review and internal auditor/external auditor evaluation considered highly 
important.  Hence, the audit committee is expected to play an important role in 
monitoring internal controls besides the board of directors.   
 
3.1.3 Effectiveness of Governance Structures and Internal Control Quality 
Studies have shown that more effective boards and audit committees are 
associated with stronger corporate governance.  Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) 
both find that firms with weak corporate governance characteristics, such as a lack of an 
audit committee, less independent boards, having a CEO who also serves as the 
Chairman of the board, etc., are more likely to be subject to fraudulent reporting.   Klein 
(2002b) and Xie et al. (2001) find that more effective boards n  audit committees, 
measured by their composition and activity, are associated wi h higher earnings quality.   
Last, studies have shown that more effective audit committees are associated with the 
hiring of external auditors who are more independent (Carcello and Neal 2000) and 
auditors who have greater industry expertise (Abbott and Parker 2000).  
 
I expect firms with more effective governance structures to have higher quality 
internal controls.  More effective audit committees and boards, comprised mainly of 
independent directors, are less likely to be influenced by top managers.  As such, they are 
more likely to protect shareholders’ interests and impleent effective internal controls to 
curb managers’ opportunistic behaviors.   High-quality audit committees are more likely 
to engage in discussions with the internal and external auditors about their assessment of 
 25 
internal control (Krishnan 2005).   They are also more likely to follow up on concerns 
about the quality of internal controls by eliciting recommendations for improvement and 
ensuring that management carries out these recommendations.  In addition, more 
effective audit committees or boards have higher levels of accounting and financial 
expertise that enable them to better understand complex internal control issues, which is 
important in attempting to achieve an effective overall internal control system.  A 
detailed discussion on how I measure the effectiveness of the firm’s governance 
structure, i.e. the board of directors and audit committee, is found in Chapter 4.1 of this 
study.  
 
Only two studies directly explore the link between interal control quality and 
corporate governance structures (Krishnan 2005, Krishnan and Visvanathan 2005).  
Krishnan (2005) examines a sample of firms disclosing internal control problems 
surrounding auditor changes during the period 1994-2000.  She finds that these firms 
have audit committees that are more independent and have a higher level of expertise 
compared to a control sample of firms changing auditors but not disclosing internal 
control problems.  However, because her sample was restrict d to firms subject to auditor 
changes, the results may not be generalizable to all firms.  Further, her study is conducted 
prior to SOX.  Recent policy changes are likely to intensify the pressures for firms to 
improve their corporate governance mechanisms, making it mportant to examine 
whether the results in Krishnan (2005) hold in the post-SOX period.    
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Perhaps more importantly, Krishnan’s study is focused on examining the 
characteristics of the audit committee.  However, the effectiveness of the audit committee 
may depend on board characteristics.  For instance, the report of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999) states 
that “audit committee performance relies on the practices and attitudes of the entire 
board.”   Beasley and Salterio (2001) find that firms with strong board governance 
attributes are more likely to voluntarily form audit committees composed of members 
with relevant financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience.  Klein 
(2002a) provides further evidence that audit committee independence increases with 
board size and board independence.  Hence, failure to conrol for board characteristics 
when examining the relation between audit committee characteristics and internal control 
quality can potentially introduce an endogeneity problem in the regression results.    
 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2005) examine the role of audit committees and 
auditors in the reporting of internal control deficiencies after the passage of SOX.  The 
authors find that a higher number of meetings of the audit committee, smaller proportion 
of financial experts in the audit committee, and more auditor changes characterize firms 
that report weaknesses in their internal controls compared to firms with no weaknesses.  
Prior restatements are also higher for firms not reporting such weaknesses.  However, the 
study does not find differences in the size of the audit committees between firms with and 
without weaknesses, and the authors do not examine the indepe dence of the audit 
committee nor the board characteristics.  
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Based on the discussions above, I complement Krishnan (2005) and Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2005) by hypothesizing that less effective audit committees and boards of 
directors are associated with lower internal control quality.  I examine firms that 
disclosed MW under SOX 302, which is a more representative sample than that used in 
Krishnan (2005).  By using this sample of firms, I am also able to examine whether the 
results in Krishnan (2005) hold in the post-SOX period, and whether the results hold 
when I examine a more comprehensive set of corporate governance characteristics that 
include both the board and audit committee characteristics.  Because the incidence of 
MW is an indication of lower internal control quality, I expect that firms with less 
effective audit committees and boards of directors to be more likely to have MW.  A 
summary of all the hypotheses developed in this study can be found in APPENDIX A.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with weaker corporate governance structures, i.e. less effective 
audit committees and boards of directors, are more likely to have MW. 
 
3.2 Reputational Penalties for Internal Control Failures 
Much of the existing research has shown the potential impact of internal control 
weaknesses on firms’ earnings quality and users’ perception of the firms’ earnings 
numbers.  However, little is known of the impact inter al control weaknesses have on the 
governance structures of firms.  As mentioned earlier, th  audit committee and the board 
play an important role in maintaining effective internal controls as a way of monitoring 
managers’ behaviors.  Hence, the audit committee and the board should be held 
accountable for internal control failures.  Because labor market forces also extend to top 
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managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983) and top managers have 
responsibilities in ensuring effective internal controls under SOX, I also examine whether 
top managers suffer similar reputational penalties.  Failure to remove such individuals 
when monitoring fails would imply weak corporate governance (DeFond and Hung 
2004).  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that board membership confers ben fits to 
directors and that outside directors are rewarded by the reputation they develop as expert 
monitors.   Specifically, outside directors use their directorships to signal to internal and 
external markets that (1) they are decision experts, (2) they understand the importance of 
diffuse and separate decision control, and (3) they can work with such decision control 
systems.   Good performance by board directors has the potential o lead to better 
opportunities for the directors going forward.  On the other hand, Fama and Jensen argue 
that labor market forces impose disciplinary actions on directors when monitoring fails.  
Such reputational penalties include not only loss of their boa d positions, but also extend 
to the loss of directorships in other firms in which the directors sit on.  As such, directors 
have an ex-ante incentive to be efficient monitors (Sinivasan 2005).  Evidence that the 
labor market imposes reputational penalties on directors for monitoring failures is evident 
in the following studies. 
 
Gilson (1990) examines disciplinary actions against directors in 111 publicly 
traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 
1979 and 1985. He finds that on average, only 46 percent of incumbent directors remain 
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when bankruptcy or debt restructuring ends.  Directors who resign hold significantly 
fewer seats on other boards following their departure.   
 
Srinivasan (2005) uses a sample of 409 companies that announced restatements 
from 1997 to 2001 to provide evidence on the labor market penalties for outside 
directors, particularly audit committee members, from financial reporting failure.  He 
finds significantly higher turnover of boards for firms tha  restate earnings downward, 
with 48.1 percent of outside directors turning over within tree years of the restatement 
announcement.  Further, the likelihood of director turnover increases with the severity of 
the restatement and is greater for audit committee members than for other directors.  Last, 
for firms that overstate earnings, directors of these firms are no longer present in 25 
percent of their positions on other boards.   
 
There have been no studies conducted yet to examine the p nalties imposed on 
audit committee members and outside directors as a result of internal control failures.  
Although MW in internal controls are less serious than outright fraud, weak internal 
controls and fraud are closely related (Bell and Carcello 2000).   For instance, Bell and 
Carcello (2000) examine the effectiveness of the risk-factor examples presented in SAS 
No. 53 at distinguishing between fraud and nonfraud engagements.  The authors find that 
among the risk factors, a weak internal control environment is positively related to the 
incidence of fraud.  In 1999, a study commissioned by COSO found that a poor internal 
control environment contributed to the occurrences of fraud documented over the ten year 
time frame 1987-1997.  Given that internal control failures could result in frauds, I expect 
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that internal control failures will exert pressure on the firm to remove ineffective audit 
committee members and outside directors.  
 
Recent concerns over weak internal controls as leading to poor financial reporting 
quality and the publicity surrounding several high profile cases (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, 
etc.) likely heightened the attention of investors and regulators to internal controls.  The 
increased scrutiny by investors and regulators are likely to furher intensify a firm’s 
pressures to punish audit committee members and outside directors for internal control 
failures.  As in Srinivasan (2005), I focus only on outside dir ctors rather than the entire 
board because the academic literature and regulators emphasize the role of these directors 
in monitoring financial reporting and Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that the risk and 
rewards of board memberships apply to these directors.  Hence, throughout this paper, 
“outside directors” refer to the directors on the entir  board that are not employees of the 
firm.  I expect the reputational penalties imposed on audit committee members and 
outside directors to include not only the loss of directorships within the firm, but also the 
loss of outside directorships in other public companies these individuals hold.   
 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with MW experience greater turnover of audit committee 
members and outside directors following the MW detection, compared to firms without 
internal control weaknesses.  
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Hypothesis 2b: Audit committee members and outside directors in firms with MW lose 
more outside directorships in other public companies following the MW detection, 
compared to their counterparts in firms without internal control weaknesses.  
 
Fama (1980) posits the existence of the managerial labor market as managers’ 
principal disciplinary force.  According to Fama, “the variability of the large corporation 
with diffuse security ownership is better explained in terms of a model where the primary 
disciplinary action comes through managerial labor markets, both within and outside of 
the firm, with the assistance from the panoply of inter al and external monitoring devices 
that evolve to stimulate the ongoing efficiency of the corporate form, and with the market 
for outside takeovers providing discipline of last resort.”  Disciplinary actions can be 
imposed on top managers through their removal from the firm for ineffectiveness, and 
such actions could influence managerial actions and incentives ex ante (Desai et al. 2006, 
Agrawal et al. 1999).4    
 
Desai et al. (2006) detect severe external labor market consequences for managers 
of firms charged with aggressive accounting.  The authors find that their sample firms 
that announced earnings restatements in 1997 or 1998 experienced significantly higher 
turnover of top management, i.e., Chairman, CEO, or President, following the 
                                               
 
 
4 Gilson (1989) contends that top management, when forced to l ave the firm, are likely to suffer possible 
losses in income and firm-specific human capital, and in any power, prestige, and other non-pecuniary 
benefits they derived from managing their firms.  Management changes also adversely affect managers’ 
reputations if turnover is viewed as a sign of incompetence.  Based on this argument, if internal control 
failures impose costs on managers through the loss of position within the firm, this disciplinary mechanism 
can provide incentives for managers to avoid internal control failures.  The penalty implicit in the 
managerial labor market may thus help to reduce the costs of monitoring managers within the firm.   
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restatements than control firms that do not restate earnings.  The authors conclude that 
the corporate boards impose significant penalties on managers for violating GAAP.   
Agrawal et al. (1999) also find higher managerial turnover in fi ms discovered to have 
engaged in fraud in their univariate comparisons, although the results disappear in their 
multivariate tests.5   
 
I expect the labor market to impose similar disciplinary ctions on top managers 
for internal control failures.  Although both the board nd audit committee have roles in 
monitoring internal controls, top management is ultimately responsible for establishing 
and maintaining proper internal controls (Krishnan 2005).  Under both SOX 302 and 
SOX 404, management has to certify that they are “responsible for establishing and 
maintaining internal controls.”   Management also has to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
firm’s internal controls and report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their 
internal controls.  Given that internal control failures represent a form of inefficiency on 
the part of top management in their fiduciary duties, I expect the labor market to impose 
disciplinary actions on top management following the revelation of internal control 
weaknesses.  Such removal of top management will be consistent with what Fama (1980) 
                                               
 
 
5 Beneish (1999) investigates the penalties imposed on managers for firms that engaged in earnings 
overstatements that are subject to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC.  The results are consistent 
with Agrawal et al. (1999) in that the managers’ employment losses subsequent to the discovery of earnings 
overstatement are not different from firms that do not engage in such overstatements. 
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termed as “monitoring devices that evolve to stimulate the ongoing efficiency of the 
corporate form.”6 
 
Hypothesis 2c: Firms with MW experience greater turnover of top managers, i.e. CEO, 
Chairman, or President, compared to firms without internal control weaknesses.  
 
Srinivasan (2005) finds that the likelihood of director departure and the director’s 
loss in positions on the board of other firms increases with severity of the accounting 
restatement.   This result provides empirical support that the reputational penalties 
imposed on the directors depend on the extent of monitoring fa lure.   Internal control 
problems also vary widely according to their severity and u derlying reason, and Doyle 
et al. (2007a) contend that it is important for future research on internal controls to 
consider this variation.   
 
                                               
 
 
6 Increased shareholder activism may provide further impetus for firms to remove ineffective top 
management upon internal control failures.  According to Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), there has been a 
trend of increasing shareholder activism in the United States since the 1980s.  One reason for the increasing 
shareholder activism is the 1992 SEC’s ruling that substantially reduced the costs to shareholders of 
mounting proxy contests that challenged management teams.  Under the newer rules, shareholders can 
essentially communicate at any time in any way as long as they send a copy of the substance of the 
communication to the SEC, thus reducing the cost of coordinating shareholder actions and of blocking 
management proposals.  Further, there has been a trend of increasing institutional ownership.  According to 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2003), institutional investment in the United States 
grew from 6.1 percent of aggregate ownership of equities in 1950 to over 50 percent by 2002.  Institutional 
shareholders are increasingly engaged in corporate governance activities, introducing proxy proposals and 
negotiating with management, with a goal of improving performance (Romano 2001).  Hence, as 
shareholder activism and institutional owners’ involvement in firms’ corporate governance become more 




Doyle et al. (2007a) explore the determinants of internal control problems, 
classified by whether they are account-specific weaknesses or company-level 
weaknesses.7  The results show that firms that report account-specific weaknesses tend to 
be larger, older, financially healthier, more complex, and growing more rapidly than 
firms that report company-level weaknesses.  In contrast, firms with company-wide 
problems seem to lack the resources or experience to maintain comprehensive control 
systems.  In another study, Doyle et al. (2007b) find that the relation between weak 
internal controls and lower accruals quality is driven by weakness disclosures that relate 
to overall company-level controls, which may be more difficult to “audit around,” but not 
by auditable, account-specific weaknesses. 
 
Based on the results in the above studies, I examine whether the extent of labor 
market penalties imposed on top management and the directors depend on the severity 
and pervasiveness of the MW detected.   If top management, audi  committee members, 
and outside directors are held accountable for internal control failures, then the likelihood 
of reputational penalties being imposed on these individuals should also vary depending 
on the seriousness of the MW.  Weaknesses that are more severe and pervasive should 
reflect a greater extent of monitoring failure, which in turn increases the likelihood of 
these individuals facing greater disciplinary actions.  For example, consider the following 
MW disclosed by two different companies: 
                                               
 
 
7 The classification scheme is based on Moody’s, which posits that account-specific weaknesses are 
auditable, and company-level weaknesses are more difficult to audit around and call into question not only 
management’s ability to prepare accurate financial reports but also its ability to control the business.  
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Our independent auditors, in connection with their audit of our 2003 financial 
statements, have noted certain matters involving our inte nal control and its 
operation in connection with t e improper recording of workers’ compensation 
liabilities and operating leases in the periods affected by the restatements that 
they consider to be reportable conditions under standards established by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and have dvised us that, in 
their judgment, the reportable conditions constitute a material weakness under 
such standards. (Health Net Inc., 12/31/03 10-K) 
 
As set forth in Item 8 of this Annual Report, E&Y issued an unqualified opinion 
with respect to the financial statements for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2004. 
However, in connection with its fiscal year end audit procedures, E&Y reported to 
management and to the audit committee that the combination of identified 
reportable conditions under standards established by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, internal control deficienci s at the Company 
relating primarily to the internal control environment, the risk assessment process 
and the monitoring process that assesses the quality of the Company's internal 
control performance, which have been separately reported to the audit committee, 
and year-end audit adjustments constitute a material weakness in the Company's 
internal control over financial reporting. …The Company is taking actions to 
permit it to comply timely with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") 
in respect of its internal control over financial reporting for fiscal year 2005, 
including the engagement of another independent accounting firm to assist it with 
respect to SOX 404 compliance measures, has added additional accounting 
resources, plans to establish an internal audit function reporting to the audit 
committee and will take such other remedial measures that may be recommended 
by the audit committee. (Black Box Corporation, 3/31/04 10-K) 
  
The MW detected by Health Net Inc. relate to the incorrect recording of specific 
account balances.  This type of weakness does not appear to be severe because they can 
be easily corrected by management or “audited around” by the external auditor (for 
example, by performing more substantive tests).  The weakness also does not appear to 
be pervasive because it only affects one category of weakness, which is the failure in the 
application of accounting rules.   Given this, we are not likely to expect the weakness to 
be severe or pervasive enough to trigger reputational penalties on those individuals 
charged with monitoring internal controls.   
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In contrast, the MW detected by Black Box Corporation relate to the overall 
internal control environment, the risk assessment process, the monitoring processes, and 
the internal audit function.  These weaknesses appear to be more severe because they 
pertain to company-level controls and may also call into question the management’s 
ability to prepare accurate financial reports.  The weaknesses are also not easily corrected 
by management or “audited around” by the external auditor.  F  instance, it may be 
difficult for the external audit to compensate for the lack of internal audit function by 
conducting additional substantive tests.   The weaknesses in Black Box Corporation are 
also considered pervasive because they affect a greater number of categories of 
weaknesses, e.g. insufficient or non-existent internal audit function, insufficient 
management review, inadequate control procedures, etc.  The fact that more categories of 
weaknesses are detected would suggest a greater degree of monit ring failures by top 
management, audit committee members, and outside directors on the board.  As such, we 
can expect a greater likelihood of turnover of these individuals and a greater loss of 
outside directorships for the audit committee members and outside directors.  A more 
detailed discussion on how I determine the severity and pervasiveness of the MW 
detected is found under Section 4.4 of this study.  
 
Another aspect of MW that may affect the extent of reputational penalties 
imposed on those charged with monitoring internal controls is the persistence of the MW.   
Internal control problems persist when they are detected and are not remediated 
promptly.   The remediation of internal control problems is important because persistent 
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weaknesses further expose the firms to the risk of fraud and financial misreporting.  For 
instance, Ashbaugh et al. (2006a) find that firms that remediate internal control 
weaknesses experience an improvement in earnings quality while those that fail to 
remediate do not.  Further, Moody’s has maintained that the existence of ongoing and 
uncertain internal control problems with financial reporting can trigger negative rating 
action against the firm (Moody’s 2006).  This further suggests that the prompt 
remediation of internal control problems is necessary to estore confidence in financial 
reporting.  Given the negative effects associated with the persistence of internal control 
weaknesses, it may be possible that firms have greater incent ves to remove ineffective 
individuals when the MW persist.   
 
While the discovery of any MW itself would point to a monit ring failure, the 
prompt remediation of MW can provide the opportunity for top management, audit 
committee members, and outside directors to “redeem” themselves and to regain 
investors’ trust in their monitoring responsibilities.   For instance, in the case of Black 
Box Corporation mentioned earlier, although the MW were considered severe, they were 
remediated promptly and even before the first SOX 404 report was issued.  As such, the 
prompt remediation demonstrates the superior ability and commitment of top 
management, audit committee members, and outside directors in maintaining high quality 
financial reporting.   On the other hand, unremediated internal control problems would 
create more negative sentiments toward those charged with monitoring internal controls, 
because they reflect a lack of commitment by these individuals, which can intensify the 
pressure for their removal.   
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Firms with more persistent weaknesses are also more likely to have less effective 
audit committees and boards.  Goh (2006) finds that firms with audit committees that 
have greater financial expertise and boards that are morindependent, are more likely to 
remediate MW faster.  The lack of financial expertise of the audit committee members 
and the lack of independence of the outside directors in firms with persistent weaknesses 
would increase the likelihood of these individuals leaving the firm.  Following Goh 
(2006) and Ashbaugh et al. (2006a), I use the auditor’s opinion on the effectiveness of 
internal controls in the SOX 404 reports to determine the persistence of the MW.  A more 
detailed discussion on how I measure persistence of MW is found in Section 4.4 of this 
study.  Given the above discussions, it is hypothesized as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with more severe, pervasive, and persistent MW experience 
greater turnover of top managers, audit committee members and outside directors 
following the MW detection. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Audit committee members and outside directors of firms with more 
severe, pervasive, and persistent MW lose more directorships in other firms following 
the MW detection.  
 
3.3 Improvement in Corporate Governance Structure 
The discussion in the preceding section has focused on turnover of top managers 
and directors as a result of internal control failures.  However, the removal of these 
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individuals may not necessarily produce the desired benefits (i.e., restoring shareholders’ 
confidence, recovering reputational capital, reducing legal liabi ity, etc.) if these directors 
are replaced by equally ineffective directors.  For instance, ousting an inside director after 
the MW detection, and merely replacing this director with another insider may not 
improve the overall governance structure (Farber 2005).  Further, it is also likely that 
shareholders may see such attempts as purely cosmetic, further thwarting the firm’s 
attempt to restore investor confidence.  Hence, it is important to examine whether upon 
the MW detection, these firms not only punish top management by removing them from 
the firm, but also improve overall corporate governance structures.  A priori, I expect 
firms to improve their corporate governance structures pon the MW detection, as 
discussed below. 
 
Agrawal et al. (1999) argue that fraud not only can alter the net benefits of 
managerial turnover, but it can also change the optimal structure of the board.  New 
board members can bring with them reputational capital that has relatively high value, 
especially among the firm’s investors or suppliers, following fraud.  Because one board 
function is to monitor the performance of top managers (Fama and Jensen 1983), the 
discovery of fraud may reveal a failure by the board to monitor managers effectively.  As 
such, a management change upon a fraud discovery can increase th  net returns to 
managerial oversight, increasing the value of new board members’ services, particularly 
independent members.   
 
 40 
In a similar vein, if internal control failures reveal the ineffectiveness of the board 
or audit committee to ensure managers maintain effective internal controls, the firm will 
enjoy increased net returns to managerial oversight throug  the improvement of the 
effectiveness of the board or audit committee.   Further, just as for fraud, negative 
publicity is likely to ensue following publicity of internal control failures, prompting the 
firm to find ways to recover lost reputation capital (Agrawal et al. 1999).  The 
improvement in the effectiveness of corporate governance structure can be a way for the 
firm to reinvest in and attempt to reestablish the firm’s reputation capital.   
 
As mentioned earlier, existing studies have shown that firms experience declines 
in stock prices when MW are disclosed (Emanuels et al. 2006, Hammersley et al. 2006).  
As such, improvement in governance structures may also he p t e firm to recover its 
performance (Agrawal et al. 1999).  For instance, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) document 
small positive mean abnormal returns over a two-day window centered on the 
announcement dates of outside director appointments.  Farber (2005) finds a positive and 
economically significant relation between increases in board independence and long-run 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the three year period foll wing fraud detection.  To 
the extent that governance structure improvements help signal the firm’s commitment to 
restoring effective internal controls and improving financi l reporting quality, I expect 
firms to have strong incentives to improve their governance structures upon revelation of 
internal control weaknesses.  Further, improving the governance structures also helps to 
limit the firm’s legal liability resulting from either a failure to ensure effective internal 
controls or a sharp stock price decline triggered by such internal control failure.  
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The only study that examines the improvement of governance structures upon 
financial reporting failures is Farber (2005).  Farber (2005) examines corporate 
governance changes for a sample of 87 firms identified by the SEC as fraudulently 
manipulating their financial statements.  He finds that while fraud firms’ governance 
structures are initially weak, by the end of a three-year p riod following the year of fraud 
detection these firms have a similar board of director pr file and proportion of firms with 
the combined CEO and Chairman position to that of their matched control firms.  He also 
finds that fraud firms hold more audit committee meetings than their matched control 
firms by the end of this same period.  Overall, the results of his study suggest that 
improving the quality of governance is important to fraud firms.   
 
The recent high profile corporate failures and focus on internal control 
breakdowns likely heightened the public’s attention toward firms’ governance structures.  
Given this, firms across the board are likely to improve their governance structures and it 
is necessary to compare the improvement in the governance structures of the MW firms 
relative to the control firms.  If the MW firms have greater incentives to improve their 
governance structures than the control firms for the reasons stated above, then we can 
expect the MW firms to show improvement in their governance structures relative to the 
control firms.8  Hence, it is hypothesized as follows: 
                                               
 
 
8 Readers may feel that because the MW firms started off as having weaker corporate governance 
structures, they may have more room for improvement than he control firms. This ceiling effect likely 
works in the direction of the hypothesis, and is a limitation of the study that is further explained in the 
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Hypothesis 4: Corporate governance structures, i.e., effectiveness of the audit 
committees and boards of directors, of the MW firms improve upon the MW detection, 
when compared to the control firms.   
 
As discussed earlier, firms with MW have incentives to improve their governance 
structures in order to increase the value of new board members’ service, to recover lost 
reputation capital, and to recover stock performance.  Hence, I expect the extent of 
improvement in governance structures to be increasing in the level of incentives faced by 
the firm.  The level of incentives is, in turn, dependent on the characteristics of the MW 
detected. 
 
One factor that can affect a firm’s incentives to improve its governance structures 
is the severity and pervasiveness of the MW disclosed.  More severe and pervasive 
detected weaknesses can reveal a greater extent of monitoring failures and, hence, a 
greater degree of inefficiency on the audit committee members and outside directors.  
When weaknesses are more severe and pervasive, the firm is likely to enjoy greater 
increases in net returns to managerial oversight through the improvement in the board 
                                                                                                                      
 
 
limitation section of this study.  However, this ceiling effect is mitigated for the following reasons. The 
descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that there is still room for improvement in the governance structures 
of the control firms.  Further, the control firms should also have adequate incentives to improve their 
governance structures in the wake of recent accounting scandals and the passage of SOX.  One argument 
that strengthens the results in Hypothesis 4 is that if the MW firms started out as having weak governance 
structures, they should also have a greater tendency to remain weak in general and snub the improvement 
of governance structure.  This self-selection in the choice f MW firms thus works against finding positive 
results for Hypothesis 4. 
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and audit committee effectiveness.  Further, because the  weaknesses expose the firm to 
a greater likelihood of frauds and legal risks, the firm has incentives to improve its 
governance structure to reduce the likelihood of frauds and legal iability.  Last, because 
more severe and pervasive weaknesses trigger a greater decline in the stock price 
(Hammersley et al. 2006, Emanuels et al. 2006), the firm is likely to improve its 
governance structure in order to recover its stock performance or at least, to prevent 
further decline in its stock price.   
 
Consider the case of Health Net Inc. in which the MW detected relate to the 
incorrect recording of specific account balances.  The MW is not considered to be severe 
or pervasive (because it only affects one category of weaknesses, i.e. the failure in the 
application of accounting rules).  Because the MW can be easily corrected by 
management or “audited around” by the external auditor, the firm has less incentive to 
improve its governance structure.   In contrast, in the case of Black Box Corporation, the 
MW relate to company-level controls such as the overall internal control environment, 
the monitoring process, internal audit function, etc.  These MW are more severe and 
more pervasive (because they affect more categories of weakness).   Because the MW 
suggest a greater degree of inefficiency by the audit committee members and outside 
directors in internal control monitoring, the firm is more likely to enjoy a greater increase 
in net returns to managerial oversight by improving its governance structure.  
 
The persistence of MW can also have an effect on a firm’s incentives to improve 
governance structure.  On one hand, the board and audit committee may be able to 
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demonstrate that they have discharged their fiduciary duties by ensuring that internal 
control weaknesses are promptly remediated.  Because the directors have proven to be 
effective monitors, replacing these directors will not necessarily increase the value of 
new board members’ service or improve the governance structure.  On the other hand, the 
failure to promptly remediate such weaknesses accentuates the directors’ inability or 
unwillingness in discharging their fiduciary duties.  Given this, the firm will enjoy a 
greater increase in the value of new board members’ service when they appoint more 
effective directors to the board, and the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs.  
 
Further, internal control weaknesses may persist either because the weaknesses 
simply take more time to remediate (e.g. information technology investment, 
implementing company wide policies and procedures, hiring of qualified finance 
personnel, etc.) or the firm may face financial constraints to do so.  The persistence of 
internal control weaknesses can increase the firm’s exposure to legal liability from its 
shareholders.  As such, the firm may seek to improve the ffectiveness of its governance 
structures in the short-run (e.g. by removing an insider from the board, by holding more 
meetings, by appointing more existing directors to the audit committee, etc.) so as to 
reduce its legal liability.  The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: For firms with MW, improvement in corporate governance structures, 
i.e., effectiveness of the audit committees and boards of directors, is increasing in the 
severity, pervasiveness, and persistence of the MW.     
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3.4 Market Response to Improvement in Governance Structures 
Because improving the corporate governance structure is costly, an important 
question is whether such improvements provide tangible ben fits to the firms.  Following 
the revelation of various accounting improprieties at several high profile companies, 
regulators have been concerned with the integrity of financial reporting systems and 
investor confidence in the capital market.  Hence, I examine whether the improvement in 
governance structures help restore the capital market’s confidence toward financial 
reporting and whether these improvements are being perceived positively by market 
participants.   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, evidence that internal control weaknesses are 
perceived negatively by the market is shown in several ext nt studies (Hammersley et al. 
2006, Ashbaugh et al. 2006b, Emanuels et al. 2006, Beneish et al. 2006)   These studies 
generally find that firms with internal control weakness s experience significant negative 
abnormal returns within the three-day window of the date of disclosure.  Several 
explanations have been offered for the negative stock maret reaction to the disclosures 
of internal control weaknesses.  
 
Hammersley et al. (2006) point out that such negative market reaction is indicative of 
investors’ reassessing the quality of management’s oversight over the financial reporting 
process, leading to revisions in expectations about the firm’s future profitability or to 
revisions in perceptions of firm risk.  Emanuels et al. (2006) also contend that the 
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disclosure of internal control problems will decrease the value of the firm’s stock because 
of the increased risk of bad performance.  
 
Beneish et al. (2006) argue that investors may not have recognized that firms 
disclosing MW have poor earnings quality because investors often verlook value-
relevant information in financial statements.  Hence, MW disclosures under SOX 302 
provide value-relevant information which reflects the lower credibility of firms’ financial 
reports.  Because investors require compensation for uncertainty about a firm’s financial 
reporting, the disclosure of a MW under SOX has an adverse impact on the firm’s stock 
price and cost of capital.  Consistent with this argument, Ashbaugh et al. (2006b) posit 
that poor internal controls that result in less reliable financial reporting also increase the 
information risk faced by investors that manifests in a higher cost of capital.   
 
The above evidence suggests that the capital market punishes firms with weak 
internal controls either through discounting stock price wh n weaknesses are disclosed or 
through a higher cost of capital.  However, if the market perceives the improvement in 
governance structures as credible signals that the financial reporting quality is enhanced, 
then they ought to reward the firm by assigning a higher firm value and lower cost of 
equity (Farber 2005).  Farber (2005) contends that there are difficulties (e.g. missing 
forecasts) involved in directly estimating changes in cost of equity capital associated with 
governance improvements.  In his study, he takes an indirect approach and measures 
changes in cost of equity capital using buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  Such an approach 
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is justified because increases in returns would be consiste t with a decline in the cost of 
equity capital, and returns directly affect the cost of equity capital.  
 
Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns also allows the examination of the long-
term effect of internal control weakness disclosure.  Emanuel et al. (2006) find that the 
initial negative abnormal returns due to internal contrl weaknesses have a much weaker 
effect subsequent to the disclosure.  Hence, the capital market only penalizes the firms 
before or around the time of initial disclosures but not subsequently.  If weak internal 
controls incentivize firms to improve their governance structures, and these 
improvements reduce investors’ uncertainty over firms’ financial reporting, then the 
changes will be gradually impounded in stock prices subsequent to the MW detection.  
This positive market reaction can be measured more effectively using a long window 
period, e.g. one-year or two-year period following the initial disclosure.  
 
Only three studies have provided direct evidence on the market’s eaction to 
changes in corporate governance structures.  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find a small 
positive mean abnormal return over a two-day window centerd on the announcement 
dates of outside director appointments.  DeFond et al. (2005) find a positive market 
reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts to he audit committees, but 
no market reaction to the appointment of nonaccounting financial experts to the audit 
committee.  Last, Farber (2005), using a sample of firms identified by the SEC as 
fraudulently manipulating their financial statements, finds a positive and economically 
significant relation between improvement in board independence and long-run buy-and-
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hold abnormal returns over the three-year period following the fraud detection.  To the 
extent that improvements in governance structures for firms with MW are perceived 
positively by the market, I expect such improvements to be associated with positive long-
run abnormal returns for these firms.   
 
Hypothesis 5: For firms with MW, improvement in corporate governance structures, 
i.e., effectiveness of the audit committees and boards of directors, results in a positive 
long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns.     
 
As explained above, investors are likely to perceive the improvement in the audit 
committee and the board as credible signals that the financ al reporting quality is 
enhanced, and react positively to such improvements.  Given this, the extent of the 
market reaction to the improvement in governance structure should depend on the extent 
to which investors perceive the financial reporting quality to be undermined.  That is, the 
greater the extent to which the financial reporting quality is undermined, the more 
benefits the investors perceive to accrue from the improvement in governance structures.   
 
The extent to which investors perceive the financial reporting quality to be 
undermined depends on the severity and pervasiveness of the MW disclosed.   
Hammersley et al. (2006) find that the market’s reaction to characteristics of internal 
control weaknesses is contingent on the severity of he weaknesses.  Emanuels et al. 
(2006) find that less severe internal control weaknesses, uch as staffing issues, have no 
significant effect on stock returns, while problems related to financial reporting 
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complexity lead to significant negative abnormal returns.  These results suggest that less 
severe and pervasive MW are less likely to cause investors to reevaluate their assessment 
of the firm’s financial reporting quality.  This, in turn, may attenuate the investors’ 
reactions to the improvement in governance structures.  
 
For instance, take the case of Health Net Inc. in which the MW are considered 
neither severe nor pervasive because the weakness relates to the incorrect recording of 
two specific account balances.  In this case, investors may not perceive the firm’s 
financial reporting quality to be severely undermined, and may perceive little benefits 
accruing from the improvement in governance structures.  In the case of Black Box 
Corporation, the MW are considered to be both severe and pervasive, and pose greater 
risks to the firm’s financial reporting (see also Ashbaugh et al 2006a, Doyle et al. 2007b).  
Because the MW cannot be corrected easily or “audited around” by the external auditors, 
the investors are likely to take additional comforts in the improvement of governance 
structures as enhancing the credibility of the firm’s financial reporting.  Given the above 
discussions, I expect the severity and pervasiveness of the MW detected to accentuate the 
long-run market’s reaction to the improvement in governance structure.   
 
On the other hand, I expect the persistence in MW (i.e. control weaknesses that 
are not remediated) to attenuate the positive effects of the improvements in governance 
structures.  Ashbaugh et al. (2006a) find that firms that remediate internal control 
weaknesses exhibit an improvement in accruals quality, while firms that fail to do so 
continue to exhibit poorer accrual quality.  Ashbaugh et al. (2006b) also find that firms 
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which disclose, but subsequently remediate internal control weaknesses, exhibit a 
decrease in cost of capital, whereas firms that fail o remediate internal control 
weaknesses exhibit no significant change in cost of capital.  These results suggest that 
when internal control weaknesses persist, investors continue to perceive the financial 
reporting process to be unreliable and assign a higher information risk to the firm.   
 
The uncertainty over the firm’s financial reporting process is likely to dampen 
investors’ perception of any positive benefits that could result from the improvements in 
governance structures.   Investors may even perceive such improvement in governance 
structures as cosmetic and feel skeptical that the new dirctors that the firm brings in are 
actually capable of maintaining effective internal contrls over financial reporting.  This 
inability to promptly restore effective internal controls can cause investors to lose more 
confidence in the firm’s financial reporting and corporate governance mechanisms.  
Given this, I expect that investors will react less positively to the improvements in 
governance structures when the MW persist than when they do not.   
 
Hypothesis 5a: For firms with MW, the positive effect of improvement in corporate 
governance structures, i.e., effectiveness of the audit committees and boards of 
directors, on long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns is (1) greater when the MW are 






4.1 Determinants of the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Structures 
4.1.1 Effectiveness of the Audit Committee 
The main objectives of this study are to examine whether weak internal controls 
are associated with weak corporate governance structures, and whether firms with MW 
take steps to improve their governance structures upon revelation of MW.  Hence, it is 
important to first establish what determines the effectiv ness of both the audit committee 
and board of directors based on a review of existing literature.  
 
Prior research suggests that audit committee effectiveness is affected by its 
composition and activity.   Perhaps the most important attribute is the independence of 
the audit committee.   Research studies have shown that more independent audit 
committees are more effective monitors.  For instance, Dechow et al. (1996) find that 
firms with independent audit committees are less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC.  
 
Klein (2002b) also finds a negative relation between the proporti n of 
independent audit committee members and abnormal accruals, which is a proxy for 
earnings quality.  Further, studies provide evidence that fully independent audit 
committees are negatively related to financial reporting misstatements or fraud (Abbott et 
al. 2000, Abbott et al. 2002).  Regulators also hold the view that independent audit 
committees are more effective monitors as SOX has now mandated that audit committees 
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be comprised fully of independent directors.9   I measure audit committee independence 
using ACINDP, which is an indicator variable coded 1 if the audit committee comprises 
of fully independent directors, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Another important attribute of audit committee effectiveness is the level of 
financial expertise of the audit committee members.  Higher financial expertise of the 
audit committee is found to be associated with fewer financial reporting problems 
(McMullen and Raghunadan 1996) and financial misstatements (Abbott et al. 2002).  
DeFond et al. (2005) also find a positive market reaction to the appointing of accounting 
financial experts to audit committees, consistent with accounting based financial skills 
improving the audit committee’s perceived ability to ensure high-quality financial 
reporting.   Given that internal control issues are complex in nature and may require a 
certain level of financial expertise to comprehend, I expect that financial expertise of the 
committee members is likely to influence the effectiveness of the audit committee in the 
monitoring of internal controls.   
 
SOX requires that firms disclose whether they have a financial expert on the audit 
committee.10  One controversy over the financial expertise requirement of SOX is the 
                                               
 
 
9 Under SOX, an “independent” director is one not receiving, other than for service on the board, any 
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer, and as not being an affiliated person of the 
issuer, or any subsidiary thereof.  Even before SOX was passed, in 1999, all of the major U.S. stock 
exchanges began requiring their registrants to have 100 percent independent audit committee members, but 
gave the board the discretion to appoint inside directors when appropriate, and also exempted small issuers.  
However, with the passing of SOX, which requires the delisting of any firm that does not comply with the 
provisions in SOX, the SEC eliminated the exemptions cotained in the pre-SOX listing standards.   
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definition of financial expertise.  The initial SOX promulgations recommended a fairly 
narrow definition of financial expertise that focuses on whether the director has prior 
accounting-related experience with SEC financial reporting a d suggests that such 
directors will have work experience as a public accountant, auditor, principal financial or 
accounting officer, or controller (“accounting financial expertise”).  However, critics 
argue that this narrow definition is unnecessarily restrictive and drastically limits the pool 
of qualified directors.  The final version of the SOX provision effectively expands the 
definition of financial expertise by also including the exp rtise gained through experience 
supervising employees with financial reporting responsibilities, overseeing the 
performance of companies and other experience (“nonaccounting financial expertise”).  
This wider definition hence captures directors who have prior experience as company 
presidents and CEOs.  Given this controversy over the definition of financial expertise, I 
examine the effectiveness of the audit committee using both definitions of financial 
expertise.  ACCEXP is the proportion of audit committee members with accounting 
financial expertise and NONACCEXP is the proportion of audit committee members 
with nonaccounting financial expertise. 
 
To achieve effectiveness, the audit committee needs to include an adequate 
number of committee members to generate substantial discussion and to consider 
                                                                                                                      
 
 
10Although firms are not required to have a financial expert on the audit committee, this disclosure 
requirement can place pressure on firms to retain at least one financial expert on the audit committee.  SOX 
also appears to have made the rules of the major U.S. stock exchanges redundant, because these exchanges 
have already required that audit committees be composed of at least one director who must have accounting 
or related financial management expertise.  However, federal criminal statues seem to be more effective 
deterrents to non-compliance than exchange rules, and implementing new rules (even redundant rules) 
gives the appearance that legislators are taking actions (DeFond and Francis 2005).  
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emerging issues, as well as have access to management, xt rnal auditors, internal 
auditors, the full board and legal counsel (DeZoort et al. 2002).  Empirical evidence 
suggests that larger audit committees are associated with higher financial reporting 
quality (Felo et al. 2003) and lower bond yield spreads (Anderson et al. 2004). Hence, I 
capture audit committee size using ACSIZE, which is the number of directors on the 
audit committee. 
 
Research studies also find that the activity of the audit committee members have 
an effect on monitoring. For instance, greater activity of the audit committee is associated 
with less fraud (Beasley et al. 2000) and the employment of an industry specialist auditor 
(Abbott and Parker 2000). I measure the audit committee’s diligence using ACMEET, 
which is the number of times the audit committee meets in a fiscal year.  
 
4.1.2 Effectiveness of the Board of Directors 
The effectiveness of the board is mainly affected by its composition and the 
diligence of the board members.  Empirical studies examining board independence have 
generally concluded that more independent boards are more effective monitors because 
independent board members are more likely to act in the inerest of shareholders and are 
less susceptible to undue influence by management (Weisbach 1988).  More independent 
boards have been found to be associated with a lower likelihood of accounting fraud 
(Beasley 1996), lower likelihood of enforcement actions by the SEC (Dechow et al. 
1996), and lower earnings management (Klein 2002b).  I measure board independence 
using BDINDP, which is the proportion of board members whoare independent.  
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Jensen (1993) argues a smaller board is a more effective monitor because a 
smaller board of directors plays a controlling function whereas a larger board is easier for 
the CEO to control.  Further, he contends that large boards function less effectively due 
to coordination and processing problems.  The studies by Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg 
et al. (1998) support this contention when they find that larger boards reduce firm value.  
Beasley (1996) also finds that smaller boards are important in deterring accounting fraud.  
These results uggest that small boards are likely to be more efficient in monitoring 
management.  I measure board size using BDSIZE, which is the number of directors on 
the board.  
 
Vafeas (1999) contends that a more diligent board acts as a more effective 
monitor because it increases the likelihood of the board taking actions beneficial to the 
shareholders, such as improving corporate performance or corporate governance.  The 
study finds that operating performance improves following years of abnormal board 
activity.  Klein (1998) also reports that meeting frequency is related to ownership 
structure and firm valuation.  Hence, I capture board activity using BDMEET, the 
number of times the board meets in a fiscal year.  
 
Last, separating the CEO and Chairman of the board positions may also 
strengthen board effectiveness (Jensen 1993).  The CEO’s power to control the board is 
often attributed to the belief that the CEO has by far the strongest voice in determining 
who is on the board of directors.  The ability of outside board members to effectively 
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monitor management may be impacted by management’s ability to mit board activities 
via controlling the board’s chairperson position.  One way stockholders limit the CEO’s 
ability to hinder outside director monitoring is to segregat the key positions of CEO and 
board chairperson.  I measure the duality of the CEO and Chairman position using the 
indicator variable DUALITY, coded 1 if the two positions are held by different 
individuals, and 0 otherwise.  
 
I collect the corporate governance variables using information from the proxy 
statements (DEF 14A) filed by the firms that disclose MW in internal controls.  I 
scrutinize information pertaining to each director on the board r audit committee as 
given in the proxy statements.  This information includes th  employment history of the 
directors, family relationships, and other material relationships.  Following Krishnan 
(2005), I define an inside director or affiliated director as “current or former officers or 
employees of the company or of a related entity, relativ s of management, professional 
advisors to the company, (e.g., consultants, bank officers, legal counsels), officers of 
significant suppliers or customers of the company,11 and interlocking directors.12   
 
I also determine if each audit committee member has accounting financial 
expertise or nonaccounting financial expertise.  Accounting financial experts are directors 
with experience as a public accountant, auditor, principal or chief financial officer, 
                                               
 
 
11 This information can be obtained from the section ‘Related Party Transactions’ in the proxy statements.  
12 The literature generally views “independence” as independence from management’s influence (see also 
Carcello and Neal 2000).  Under this definition, a director an still own stock in the company and be 
considered independent.    
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controller, or principal or chief accounting officer.  Nonaccounting financial experts are 
directors with experience as the CEO or president of a f r-profit corporation.13  This 
information is obtained by examining the employment history of each director as 
disclosed in the proxy statements.  Information on audit committee size, audit committee 
meetings, board size, board meetings, and CEO/Chairman duality are also obtained from 
the proxy statements.   
 
4.2 Sample Selection and Composition 
The internal control weaknesses disclosed under SOX provide the basis to 
identify firms with weak internal controls, and hence, the determinants of firms’ internal 
control quality.  I choose firms that disclosed weaknesses under SOX 302 instead of SOX 
404 because these weaknesses are disclosed earlier and any corporate governance 
characteristics or changes observed are more likely attributable to SOX 302 instead of 
SOX 404.  Choosing firms that disclosed weaknesses under SOX 404 may confound the 
results of the various tests performed because firms that have discovered weaknesses 
before SOX 404 may have already taken steps to improve their governance structures.   
 
I identify the sample firms from Compliance Week, AuditAnalytics,14 and the 
sample firms used in Doyle et al. (2007a).15  I focus on firms which disclosed MW 
                                               
 
 
13 The former categories are chosen based on the suggestions included in the initial version of SOX 
proposed by the SEC.  The latter categories are inferred from the final version of SOX drafted by the SEC.  
14 Compliance Week (http://www.complianceweek.com) is an internet newsletter on corporate governance, 
risk and compliance that publishes monthly reports on firms reporting internal control weaknesses since 
November 2003. AuditAnalytics (http://www.auditanalytics.com) is an online market intelligence service 
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because the reporting of MW is mandatory while the reporting of significant deficiencies 
and control deficiencies is not.16  Hence, using firms that disclosed significant 
deficiencies and control deficiencies may create self-selection problems because firms 
that voluntarily disclosed the deficiencies are more lik ly those that have stronger 
governance structures or have greater tendency to improve their governance structures.  
Further, MW represent a more severe form of internal control weakness and have the 
greatest likelihood of resulting in financial misstatements if not discovered.  Hence, 
examining the governance characteristics and changes in governance structures of firms 
with these weaknesses are more important.  
 
I choose firms that are accelerated filers and hence subj ct to SOX 404 reporting 
because these firms have greater market capitalization nd, thus, greater economic impact 
and public interest when MW exist.  These firms also face greater pressure to change 
their governance structures due to the issuance of independent auditor’s report on internal 
controls.  Based on the above discussion, I identify firms which disclosed at least one 
MW under SOX 302 from the period August 2003 to December 2004, and which are 
                                                                                                                      
 
 
from Ives Group Inc, which keeps track of all firms disclo ing internal control problems after SOX came 
into effect.  
15 I thank Jeffrey Doyle, Weili Ge, and Sarah McVay for sharing the data. The data can be found on 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~smcvay/research/ICData.html. 
16 Auditing Standards No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) identifies three levels of internal control weakness based on 
the likelihood that a material misstatement of annual or interim financial statements might result.  A control 
deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow, in the normal course of 
performing their assigned functions, management or employees to prevent or detect misstatements on a 
timely basis.  A significant deficiency adversely affects the company’s ability to record or report external 
financial data reliably in accordance with GAAP, such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a 
misstatement of a firm’s financial statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or 
detected.  Material weaknesses result in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the 
financial statements will not be prevented or detected.    
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accelerated filers.  The sample period is chosen to ensur  a large enough sample to 
perform the various tests and to permit a sufficiently long period after the disclosure of 
the initial control weaknesses to track the firm’s subsequent changes in corporate 
governance.   Further, SOX 404 comes into effect in November 2004, and the first 
disclosures of MW took place as early as January 2005.  Hence, the cut-off date of 
December 2004 ensures that all the MW disclosures pertain to SOX 302 weaknesses and 
not SOX 404 weaknesses.   
 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample collection prcedure.  Using 
Compliance Week, AuditAnalytics, and the sample firms used in Doyle et al. (2007a), I 
identified an initial sample of 502 firms that reported at le st one MW from August 2003 
to December 2004.  I exclude 152 firms that are not accelerated filers, 72 firms that 
subsequently terminated their securities registration, 26 firms that delayed the filings of 
their 10-Ks and internal control reports, 21 firms without proxy statements to obtain the 
corporate governance data, 13 firms with MW that are datd too far back (i.e. fiscal years 
2001 and 2002), 12 firms that are foreign issuers, nine firms without the second SOX 404 
reports, and eight firms that are subsidiaries of other firms within the sample.  The 
sample selection procedure yields a sample of 189 firms that reported at least one MW 











Table 1: Sample collection procedure and composition 
 
Panel A: Sample collection procedure 
 
Total material weaknesses (August 2003 to December 2004)  502 
Less: Non-accelerated filers  (152) 
Less: Securities registration termination (72) 
Less: No filings or delays in filings of 10-Ks since SOX 404 
reporting  
(26) 
Less: No proxy statements available to obtain governance data (21) 
Less: Weaknesses dated too far back (13) 
Less: Foreign issuers (12) 
Less: No second SOX 404 reports   (9) 
Less: Subsidiary of another material weakness firm (8) 
Less: No matching control firms  (5) 
Final sample (August 2003 to December 2004) 184 
 
Panel B: Composition of sample, by industry 
 
Industry SIC Code Industry Description Number of Firms 
10-17 Mining and Construction 15 
20-39 Manufacturing 67 
40-49 Transportation and Utilities 24 
50-59 Wholesale and Retail 15 
60-69 Financial Services 18 
70-89 Services 45 
Total  184 
 
Panel C: Composition of sample, by exchange listing 
 













After identifying the MW firms, I use a matched-pairs design to identify control 
firms.17  Because the control firms are selected so that they do not have weak internal 
controls (as opposed to the sample firms that have weak internal controls), I make sure 
that these firms do not report any forms of internal control problems (i.e. control 
deficiencies, significant deficiencies, or MW) under SOX 302 or SOX 404, during the 
period November 2002 to December 2006.  I use AuditAnalytics to ensure that these 
firms do not have any internal control problems, and I also examine the firms’ 10-K, 10-
Q, and 8-K filings during this period to make sure that no internal control problem of any 
nature is mentioned.  
 
I then select control firms using the following matching criteria as in similar 
studies examining fraud and internal control quality (Farber 2005, Krishnan 2005).  For 
each sample firm, I select a control firm from the same four-digit industry SIC code, and 
with net sales within + or – 25 percent of the firm’s net sales for the 2003 fiscal year 
(Farber 2005).  I also choose a control firm within the same stock exchange because 
exchange listings have an impact on firms’ governance structures.  If I cannot find a 
match within the same four-digit SIC code, I relax the above criteria to include firms with 
the same three-digit code, or two-digit code, or one-digit code.  I also choose control 
                                               
 
 
17 I use a matched-sample design as opposed to a random sample because prior studies have shown that 
fraud or internal control weaknesses firms tend to be concentrated in certain industries (Farber 2005, 
Krishnan 2005).  Hence, a matched sample based on industries classification would ensure that the sample 
firms and control firms have the same distribution of industries.  Further, the use of a matched-sample 
design ensures that the sample firms and control firms a e imilar in terms of important characteristics, 
which makes univariate comparisons more meaningful.  The use of matched-pair sample design is also 
evident in recent studies such as Farber (2005), Krishnan (2005), and Desai et al. (2006).  
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firms that are accelerated filers as are the sample firms, because accelerated and non-
accelerated filers may face different incentives to improve their governance structures.   
 
Based on the above matching procedure, five firms were further excluded because 
I was unable to find control firms even at the one-digit SIC code. The final usable sample 
consists of 184 firms that are matched to the MW firms ba ed on the same stock 
exchanges, within 25 percent of the MW firms’ net sales, and at least at the one-digit SIC 
code.  The matching on exchange listing is perfect.  One hudred two firms were 
matched based on four-digit SIC code, 15 firms were matched on three-digit SIC code, 
and 36 firms were matched based on two-digit SIC code. The remaining 31 firms were 
matched based on one-digit SIC code.  Hence, the matching based on industries is not 
perfect.18 The mean net sales of the MW firms and control firms (untabulated) are $1.84 
billion and $1.62 billion, respectively, and this difference is not statistically significant (p 
= 0.67).  This shows that the matching of net sales is also successful.  The market value 
of equity of the MW firms and control firms (untabulated) are $1.58 billion and $1.95 
billion, respectively, and this difference is also not sta i tically significant (p = 0.53).   
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the composition of the MW firms and control firms 
based on the two-digit industry SIC codes.  The panel show  a relatively high 
concentration of MW firms in the manufacturing and services industries.  This result is 
                                               
 
 
18 The matching based on one-digit is unavoidable in the matching process.  Because matching based on 
one-digit SIC code may not be a good match, this is considered as a limitation of this study and is discussed 
under Section 6.3 of this study.  I also replicate the results after excluding these 31 firms, and the results are 
the same as those presented in this study. 
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consistent with Krishnan (2005) and Farber (2005) which find a relatively high number 
of firms with internal control problems and frauds, respectiv ly, in these industries.  
Panel C of Table 1 shows the composition of the MW firms based on their exchange 
listing.  The panel shows that the sample firms are mostly listed on the larger stock 
exchanges, i.e., NYSE and NASDAQ.  The likely reason for this result is the accelerated-
filer status of the sample and control firms.   
 
4.3 Testing the Relation between Audit Committee and Board Effectiveness and the 
Incidence of MW (Hypothesis 1) 
I use the following conditional logit regression model to test whether the 
effectiveness of the audit committee and the board, is negatively associated with the 
incidence of MW.  The conditional logistic regression is useful in investigating the 
relation between an outcome (whether the firm is a sample firm with MW or a control 
firm without such weaknesses) and a set of explanatory variables in a matched-pairs 
design (see Hosmer and  Lemeshow 2000).19  The model can take into account the non-
random nature of the data and yield maximum likelihood estimators of the explanatory 
variables in the logistic regression model which are consistent and asymptotically 
normally distributed.  Examples of other studies that use thi  type of regression model to 
analyze matched-pairs data include Zhang et al. (2006) and Carcello et al. (2006).  
                                               
 
 
19 According to Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), in a matched-pairs design, the matching criteria create 
many strata and few observations per stratum.  As such, this increases the coefficients for the stratum-
specific design variables.  If we regard the stratum specific parameters as nuisance parameters and are 
willing to forgo their estimation, then we can create  conditional likelihood which will yield maximum 
likelihood estimators of the slope coefficients in the logistic regression model which are consistent and 
asymptotically normally distributed.  This explains why tere is no intercept term in the conditional logit 
model.  I use the proc mdc command in SAS program to run the conditional logit model.   
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Pr (MWF=1) = a + b1ACINDP + b2ACCEXP + b3NONACCEXP + b4ACSIZE + 
b5ACMEET + b6BDINDP + b7BDSIZE + b8BDMEET + b9DUALITY + 
b10BLOCKOWN + b11INSIDEOWN + b12INSTOWN + b13LGTA + 
b14ZFC + b15SEGMENTS + b16FOREIGN + b17GROWTH + 
b18MARESTR + b19LITIGATION + ε 
 
The dependent variable, MWF, is coded 1 for firms with MW, and 0 for the 
control firms.  To reduce the possibility that firms may change their governance 
structures at the time of detection of MW, I measure the corporate governance variables 
based on the year prior to the MW detection.  The control variables are also measured 
based on the year prior to the MW detection, except for FOREIGN and MARESTR, 
which are coded 1 based on whether the firms reported foreign currency translation 
adjustment, mergers, acquisitions, or restructuring either n the fiscal year prior to the 
MW detection or in the fiscal year of the MW detection.  Hypothesis 1 predicts the 
coefficients b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b8 and b9 to be negative and significant, and the 
coefficient b7 to be positive and significant.  APPENDIX B summarizes the definition of 
the variables in the regression model, as well as the exp cted signs of the independent 
variables.   
 
I control for other monitoring mechanisms that may affect the quality of the 
firm’s internal controls.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Jensen (1993) note that large 
blockholders have incentives to monitor management and serve as an additional control 
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mechanism.  The presence of this control mechanism may reduce the need for monitoring 
by a board or audit committee.  I consider a major sharehold r as a blockholder if the 
individual holds at least five percent stake in the firm’s stock (Desai et al. 2006).  
Following Farber (2005), I measure the extent of blockholders’ monitoring by the 
percentage of stock held by blockholders (BLOCKOWN).  A larger proportion of insider 
holdings can improve corporate governance because it better aligns the insiders’ interests 
with shareholders’ interests.  Hence, I expect that firms with greater ownership held by 
management and directors are less likely to have MW.  I use INSIDEOWN to represent 
the total percentage of stock held by management and directors (Farber 2005).   
 
Institutional shareholders can also improve corporate governance through better 
external monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).  Hence, I expect that higher institutional 
ownership reduces the likelihood of MW.  Institutional ownership is measured by 
INSTOWN, which is the percent of stock held by all institutional owners of the firm.  I 
hand-collect information on blockholders and percentage of stock held by management 
and directors from the proxy statements.  Data on institutional holdings are obtained from 
the CDA Investment Technologies Spectrum database, which is derived from the SEC 
Form 13-F disclosure forms reported quarterly to the SEC.  
 
As shown in Chapter 2, firms with internal control defici ncies exhibit certain 
financial characteristics that need to be controlled when examining the relation between 
the incidence of MW and corporate governance structures.  Smaller firms and firms in 
financial distress have less adequate resources and are more prone to internal control 
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weaknesses.  Hence, I control for firm size using LGTA, which is the log of total assets 
of the firm20.  I capture distress risk using the Zmijewski’s (1984) measure of financial 
distress (ZFC).   The measure is calculated from the probit coefficients of Zmijewski 
(1984), with greater values of ZFC indicating higher levels of distress present in the firm. 
 
Firms that operate in diversified operating segments, or in both domestic and 
foreign markets are likely to have larger operations and more complex transactions, 
increasing the likelihood that internal controls fail to meet the demands of complex 
business operations.  Consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2007), I use the number of 
business segments, SEGMENTS, as reported in the Compustat Segment File to control 
for the complexity of the firm.  I also use FOREIGN to proxy for the scope of the firm’s 
operations.  The indicator variable is coded 1 if the firm reports a non-zero foreign 
currency translation, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Firms that are undergoing restructuring may complicate firms’ attempts to ensure 
effective internal controls.  Fast growing firms also experience rapid growth in sales 
revenues and operations that may outpace the rate in which the firms invest in internal 
controls for financial reporting.  As such, these firms are exposed to increasing control 
risks.  The indicator variable, MARESTR, is coded 1 if the firm reports any restructuring 
                                               
 
 
20 The research design section shows that although the matching based on sales is successful (the mean net 
sales of the MW firms and control firms are $1.84 billion and $1.62 billion, respectively, and this 
difference is not significant with p = 0.67), the matching s still not perfect and the MW firms have larger 
sales than the control firms.  Because both total assets and sales are proxies for firm size, the addition of the 
variable, log of total assets, can also serve to further control for any differences in size between the MW
and control firms.  The results are the same when LGTA is excluded from the regression.  
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charges, or the AFTNT1 file in Compustat indicates that t e presence of a merger and 
acquisition, and 0 otherwise.  I measure sales growth using GROWTH, which is the 
percentage change in the net sales from the year prior to the MW detection to the year of 
the MW detection.  A higher percentage increase in sales hence reflects a higher level of 
sales growth21.   
 
Last, deficient internal controls over financial reporting may result in financial 
restatements and decline in stock price, further triggerin  lawsuits by shareholders if the 
firm fails to ensure effective internal controls.  This litigation risk is especially high for 
firms that operate in more litigious industries, such as the biotechnology, computers, 
electronics, and retailing industries (Francis et al. 1994), and provides further incentives 
for firms to ensure effective internal controls.  To capture firms with higher litigation 
risk, I use the indicator variable LITIGATION, which is coded 1 if a firm operates in 
industries with SIC codes 2833-2836 (biotechnology), 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 
(computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), and 5200-6961 (retailing), and 0 otherwise.  
 
4.4 Testing the Relation between the Incidence of MW and the Turnover of Top 
Management, Audit Committee Members and Outside Directors (Hypotheses 2a, 2c, 
and 3a) 
The following binary logistic regression models are used to test the relation 
between the incidence of MW and the likelihood of turnover of top management 
                                               
 
 
21 I also capture GROWTH using the three-year compound sales growth prior to the MW detection.  The 
results are qualitatively similar.  
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(MGTTURNOVER), audit committee members (ACTURNOVER), and outside directors 
(BDTURNOVER).  As before, MWF is coded 1 for MW firms, and 0 for control firms.   
 
Pr (MGTTURNOVER=1)  
= a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4RESTATE + b5LGTA 
+ b6MARESTR + b7MGTAGE + b8MGTTENURE + b9DUALITY 
+ b10BLOCKOWN + b11INSIDEOWN + b12INSTOWN + ε 
 
Pr (ACTURNOVER1=1), Pr (ACTURNOVER2=1), Pr (ACTURNOVER3=1) 
= a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4RESTATE + b5LGTA 
+ b6MARESTR + b7ACAGE + b8ACTENURE + b9DUALITY + 
b10BLOCKOWN + b11INSIDEOWN + b12INSTOWN + ε 
 
Pr (BDTURNOVER1=1), Pr (BDTURNOVER2=1), Pr (BDTURNOVER3=1) 
= a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4RESTATE + b5LGTA 
+ b6MARESTR + b7BDAGE + b8BDTENURE + b9DUALITY + 
b10BLOCKOWN + b11INSIDEOWN + b12INSTOWN + ε 
 
MGTTURNOVER is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if any individual 
holding the title of CEO, Chairman, and/ or President in the year before the MW 
detection, leaves the firm within two years of the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.  The 
indicator variable, ACTURNOVER1, is coded 1 if at least one audit committee member 
in the year before the MW detection leaves the firm within two years of the MW 
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detection, and 0 otherwise.  The indicator variables, ACTURNOVER2 and 
ACTURNOVER3, are coded 1 if at least half of the audit committee members (≥ 50%) 
and more than half of the audit committee members (> 50%), respectively, in the year 
before the MW detection leave the firm within two years of the MW detection, and 0 
otherwise.  BDTURNOVER1, BDTURNOVER2, and BDTURNOVER3 are indicator 
variables defined similarly for all the outside directors n the board in the year before the 
MW detection.  If the top management, audit committee members, and outside directors 
in the MW firms suffer penalties for internal control failures as predicted by Hypothesis 
2a and 2c, then the coefficient b1 is expected to be positive and significant in all the 
regression models.   
 
I also control for size using LGTA, which is the natural log of the total assets of 
the firm.  Consistent with Desai et al. (2006), I contrl for firm stock performance 
because turnover could also result from poor financial performance.  STKPERF measures 
the raw buy-and-hold returns over the month -12 to +12 relativ  to the disclosure of MW.  
I also control for the level of financial distress using ZFC, because Gilson (1989) and 
Gilson (1990) find that firms in higher financial distress have higher turnover of top 
management and board of directors.  Like before, ZFC is the financial distress measure, 
calculated from the probit coefficients of Zmijewski (1984), with greater values of ZFC 
indicating higher levels of distress present in the firm. 
 
Desai et al. (2006) finds that earnings restatement firmshave a higher turnover of 
top management.  The univariate test results in Srinivasan (2005) also show that earnings 
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restatement firms have a higher turnover of audit committee members and outside 
directors.  Hence, I control for the possibility that e rnings restatements will affect the 
results in the regression models.  RESTATE is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if a 
firm announces one or more earnings restatements from the year before the MW 
detection to the second year after the MW detection.22  I also include MARESTR in the 
regression model because firms undergoing mergers, acquisitions, and/or restructuring 
are also more likely to experience management or board ch nges, and hence experience 
greater turnover of top management, audit committee members and outside directors.   
 
As in Desai et al. (2006), I control for managerial and board entrenchment using 
two proxies.  The first proxy is DUALITY, which is defined earlier.  Prior research has 
used this variable as a control because CEOs who are also chairmen of the board have 
greater influence on the board and may affect turnover (Basley 1996, Dechow et al. 
1996).  The second proxy is the level of insider ownership (INSIDEOWN).  Firms with 
higher levels of blockholder ownership and institutional ownership are likely to be better 
monitored (Shleifer and Vishny 1996) and, in turn, remove ineffective managers or 
directors from the firm.  Given this, I also include BLOCKOWN and INSTOWN in the 
regression models.    
 
Last, I control for the age and tenure of top management, audit committee 
members, and outside directors.  Individuals who are older are more likely to voluntarily 
                                               
 
 
22 I also replicate the results by focusing only on those re tatements that are GAAP-mandated.  The results 
are similar to those presented in this study.  
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leave the firm due to retirement or health reasons, and individuals who have longer 
tenures may be more entrenched within the firm and less likely to leave the firm.  
MGTAGE and MGTTENURE are the mean age and tenure, respectively, of the 
individuals holding the positions of CEO, Chairman, and President.  ACAGE and 
ACTENURE (BDAGE and BDTENURE) are the mean age and tenure, respectively, of 
the audit committee members (outside directors).   
 
Hypothesis 3a further predicts that firms with more sever (SEVERE), pervasive 
(PERVADE), and persistent (PERSIST) weaknesses experienc  greater turnover of top 
management, audit committee members, and outside directors.  T  test this hypothesis, I 
repeat the above analyses by replacing MWF in each of the above regression models with 
SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST, and by conducting the analyses on the sample of 
MW firms.   
 
SEVERE is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if the firm disclosed at least one 
severe MW in either its initial or subsequent disclosure.  I use AuditAnalytics to 
determine the severity of the MW.  The database classifie  internal control weaknesses 
disclosed by a firm into broad categories of weaknesses.  APPENDIX C details the 
categories which I classify as the more severe weaknesses, and the categories which I 
classify as the non-severe weaknesses.  PERVADE is the total number of different 
categories of weaknesses in APPENDIX C that are disclosed by the sample firm in its 
initial and subsequent disclosures.   More categories of weaknesses disclosed would 
indicate a greater extent of pervasiveness in the firm’s MW.  Last, PERSIST is an 
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indicator variable that is coded 1 if the firm fails to remediate the MW within two years 
of the initial disclosure.  A firm is considered to have fully remediated the MW at the 
fiscal year end date of its first subsequent unqualified SOX 404 opinion.23  
 
4.5 Testing the Relation between the Incidence of MW and the Loss of Outside 
Directorships (Hypotheses 2b and 3b) 
The following OLS regression model is used to test the relation between the 
incidence of MW and the loss of outside directorships by audit committee members and 
outside directors.  
 
ACSEATLOSS = a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4RESTATE + b5LGTA 
+ b6ACSEATBEF + b7ACAGE + b8ACTENURE + ε 
BDSEATLOSS  = a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4RESTATE + b5LGTA 
+ b6BDSEATBEF + b7BDAGE + b8BDTENURE + ε 
 
ACSEATLOSS is defined as the mean number of outside directorships in other 
public companies lost by the audit committee members from the year before the MW 
detection to the second year following the MW detection.  BDSEATLOSS is defined as 
the mean number of outside directorships in other public companies lost by the outside 
directors from the year before the MW detection to the second year following the MW 
detection.  I first refer to the proxy statements of the MW firms to find out the number of 
                                               
 
 
23 This is also consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2006b) which considers full remediation of internal control 
weaknesses when an unqualified SOX 404 report is issued.  
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outside directorships in public companies held by each audit committee member or 
outside director in the year before the MW detection.  For those directors who are still 
with the MW firms two years after the MW detection, I collect the same information 
from the proxy statements of these firms.  For those directors who leave the MW firms, I 
use http://www.zoominfo.com24 and AuditAnalytics25 to identify any public companies 
that these directors sit on two years following the MW detection.  Then, I refer to the 
proxy statements of any one of these public companies and obtain the outside 
directorships information of the director.  Using this method, I am able to track the 
outside directorships of audit committee members and outside directors even if they have 
left the MW firms.  
 
If the revelation of MW resulted in reputational penalties through the loss of 
outside directorships (Hypothesis 2b), then I expect the coefficient b1 in the regression 
model to be positive and significant.  Size is controlled for using the log of the total assets 
of the firm, LGTA.  I also include STKPERF and ZFC to control for the possibility that 
the loss in outside directorships could be due to lackluster financial performance in the 
MW firms.  I include RESTATE because audit committees and outside directors of 
restating companies face greater likelihood of loss of outside directorships (Srinivasan 
2005).  I also control for the fact that directors with more outside directorships are more 
                                               
 
 
24 ZoomInfo, is a free internet summarization search engin that provides comprehensive information on 
over 31 million business professionals and 2 million companies across every industry.  The website tracks 
information from millions of online sources such as Web sites, press releases, electronic news services and 
SEC filings and summarizes the information into a comprehensive format.   
25 I downloaded the director information of all SEC registran s from AuditAnalytics as at December 1, 
2006.  This allows me to know any directors sitting on the board of a public company as of this date.   
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likely to lose directorships.  The variable, ACSEATBEF (BDSEATBEF), is the mean 
number of directorships in other public companies held by the audit committee members 
(outside directors) in the year before the MW detection.   Last, I control for the mean age 
and tenure of the audit committee members (ACAGE, ACTENURE) and outside 
directors (BDAGE, BDTENURE).    
 
Hypotheses 3b further predicts that the loss in outside directorships by the audit 
committee members and outside directors is increasing in the severity, pervasiveness, and 
persistence of the MW detected.  To test this hypothesis, I repeat the above analyses by 
replacing MWF in each of the regression models with SEVERE, PERVADE, and 
PERSIST, and by conducting the analyses on the sample of MW firms.  SEVERE, 
PERVADE, and PERSIST are defined as before.   
 
4.6 Testing the Relation between the Incidence of MW and Improvement in 
Corporate Governance Structures (Hypotheses 4, 4a) 
I first use univariate analyses to compare the changes in corporate governance 
characteristics from the year before the MW detection up to the second year following the 
MW detection for both the MW firms and the control firms.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that, 
in the year before the MW detection, firms with weaker corporate governance structures 
are more likely to have MW.  If, as predicted by Hypothesis 4, MW firms improve their 
governance structures relative to the control firms following the MW detection, then the 
corporate governance characteristics of the MW firms and the control firms are expected 
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to be insignificantly different in the second year following the MW detection (see also 
Farber 2005 for a similar research design).  
 
To more rigorously test the hypothesis that the MW firms show greater 
improvement in governance structures than the control firms, I create a composite 
measure of the overall improvement in audit committee and board characteristics.  A firm 
is assigned a score of 1 for each positive change in governance characteristic from the 
year before the MW detection to the second year following the MW detection, except for 
board size, in which case a score of 1 is assigned for a negative change.  The individual 
scores are then summed up to obtain the composite score of v rall improvement in 
governance structure, CHANGE.  The range of scores for CHANGE is from 0 to 9, with 
higher values indicating a greater overall improvement in governance structure.  I then 
use the following OLS regression model to test whether CHANGE is significantly greater 
for the MW firms.  If the MW firms experience greater improvements in governance 
structures than the control firms as predicted by Hypothesis 4, then MWF would be 
positive and significant.  
 
CHANGE = a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4LGTA + b5MARESTR 
+b6RESTATE +b7LITIGATION + b8BLOCKOWN + 
b9INSIDEOWN + b10INSTOWN + ε 
 
Hypothesis 4a further predicts that the improvement in governance structure for 
the MW firms is increasing in the severity, pervasiveness, and persistence of the MW.  
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 To rigorously test this hypothesis, I run the above model by replacing MWF with 
SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST, and by conducting the analyses on the sample of 
MW firms.  SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST are defined as before.  Hypothesis 4a 
predicts the coefficient of SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST to be positive and 
significant.  
 
4.7 Testing the Relation between Improvement in Governance Structures and Long-
Run Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (Hypothesis 5, 5a) 
As mentioned earlier, if the market perceived the improvement in governance 
structures as credible signals that the financial reporting quality is enhanced, they should 
reward the firm by assigning a higher firm value.  This higher firm value would be 
achieved through a higher stock price and lower cost of equity, which is reflected in 
positive long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  This approach is similar to that used in 
Farber (2005) in which examines the long-run market reaction to the firm’s improvement 
in governance structure following fraud detection.  The following regression is used to 
test the relation between the improvement in governance variables and long-run buy-and-
hold abnormal returns, BHAR.    
 
BHAR  = a + b1 ∆CGVAR + b2 ∆ROA + b3 BMV+ b4 MVE + ε 
 
The two-year buy-and-hold return (BHR) is first computed by compounding the 
monthly returns from the year before the MW detection to the year after the MW 
detection (i.e. months -12 to +12 relative to the MW detection).  This is the same as 
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STKPERF defined earlier.  Then, the two-year buy-and-hol abnormal return, BHAR, is 
computed by taking the difference between BHR of the MW firms and that of the (1) 
CRSP equal-weighted index, (2) CRSP value-weighted index, (3) CRSP S&P 500 Index, 
and (4) control firms of the same window period.  The variable, ∆CGVAR, represents the 
vector of governance variables that exhibit improvement from the year before the MW 
detection to the year after the MW detection.  Hypothesis 5 predicts that the coefficients 
for ∆CGVAR to be positive and significant, except for BDSIZE, which is predicted to be 
negative and significant.  
 
Consistent with Farber (2005), I control for financial performance using ∆ROA, 
BMV, and MVE.  The variable, ∆ROA, is the change in return on assets from the year 
before the MW detection to the year after the MW detection.  The variable, BMV, is the 
book value per share divided by the market value per share of th MW firm in the year 
before the MW detection.  Market value of equity (MVE) is the log of the market value 
of equity of the MW firm in the year before the MW detection.   
 
The results from the above analysis will shed light on hose governance variables 
of which an improvement will be capitalized in the long-run buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns.  Hypothesis 5a further predicts that the relation between the improvement in 
governance structures and the long-run buy-and-hold return is increasing in the severity 
and pervasiveness of the MW, and decreasing in the persistence of the MW.   To test this 
hypothesis, I conduct additional regression analyses by interacting those governance 
variables that exhibit improvement with SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST.  The 
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regression model is shown below.   Hypothesis 5a predicts the coefficients for b5 and b6 
to be positive and significant, and b7 to be negative and significant for all governance 
variables. 
 
BHAR  = a + b1 ∆CGVAR + b2 SEVERE+ b3 PERVADE + b4PERSIST + 
b5∆CGVAR X SEVERE + b6∆CGVAR X PERVADE + b7∆CGVAR X 





5.1 The Relation between Audit Committee and Board Effectiveness and the 
Incidence of MW (Hypothesis 1) 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and univariate tes  results.  The table 
shows that the MW firms and control firms differ in terms of the relative strength of their 
corporate governance structures.  The control firms have a greater proportion of directors 
on the audit committees who are independent (ACINDP), a greater proportion of audit 
committee members with accounting financial expertise (ACCEXP), larger audit 
committees (ACSIZE), and a greater proportion of directors on the board who are 
independent (BDINDP) than the MW firms (p < 0.05, one tailed).  The sample of MW 
firms has a greater proportion of firms with a split CEO/ Chairman leadership structure 
(DUALITY) than the sample of control firms (p < 0.10, one tailed).  The MW firms and 
the control firms, however, do not differ significantly in terms of the audit committee 
meeting frequency (ACMEET), the proportion of audit committee members with 
nonaccounting financial expertise (NONACCEXP), the sizeof the entire board 
(BDSIZE), and the board meeting frequency (BDMEET).  Among the other governance 
variables, the MW firms have a lower level of inside ownership (INSIDEOWN) and 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics and univariate tests on the incidence of MW 
  MW firms (n=184) Control firms (n=184)   
Variable a Expected sign Mean Median Mean Median t-statisticsb Wilcoxon Zc 
ACINDP - 0.72 1.00 0.82 1.00 -2.23** -2.21** 
ACCEXP - 0.14 0.00 0.20 0.20 -2.68*** -2.17** 
NONACCEXP - 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.66 -1.18 -1.10 
ACSIZE - 3.41 3.00 3.60 3.00 -2.16** 1.92** 
ACMEET - 6.36 6.00 6.00 5.00 1.22 0.94 
BDINDP - 0.62 0.62 0.69 0.69 -3.83*** -3.43*** 
BDSIZE + 8.20 8.00 8.22 8.00 -0.07 -0.14 
BDMEET - 7.85 7.00 7.50 7.00 0.83 0.16 
DUALITY - 0.46 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.34* 0.99 
BLOCKOWN - 29.8 26.8 33.1 29.8 -1.56* -1.08 
INSIDEOWN - 14.4 9.90 17.3 9.05 -1.62* -0.98 
INSTOWN - 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.55 -1.12 -1.26 
LGTA - 6.34 6.17 6.29 6.16 0.34 0.32 
ZFC + 0.091 0.0029 0.049 0.00040 2.10** 3.67*** 
SEGMENTS + 2.76 3.00 2.12 1.00 3.12*** 3.39*** 
FOREIGN + 0.38 0.00 0.21 0.00 3.48*** 3.43*** 
MARESTR + 0.68 1.00 0.58 1.00 2.17** 2.15** 
GROWTH + 0.17 0.082 0.24 0.12 -1.26 -2.15** 
LITIGATION - 0.42 0.00 0.48 0.00 -1.05 -1.05 
n  184 184   
***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on one-sided tests. 
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables 
b A two-sample t-test is used to test for significant differences in means between the MW firms and control firms.  
c A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sample test is used to testwhether the observations in the MW firms and control fi ms are from populations with different 





Table 3: Pearson correlation coefficients among independent variables 
 





Variables a ACINDP ACCEXP NONACCEXP ACSIZE ACMEET  BDINDP BDSIZE BDMEET  DUALITY  BLOCKOWN  
ACINDP  1.00 0.13** 0.12** -0.019 0.055 0.43***  -0.011 -0.043 -0.12** -0.047 
ACCEXP   1.00 -0.12** -0.085 0.062 0.082 -0.022 0.099 0.049 0.056 
NONACCEXP    1.00 0.029 0.041 0.17***  -0.016 0.063 0.0070 -0.024 
ACSIZE    1.00 0.043 0.28***  0.58***  0.14***  -0.067 -0.24***  
ACMEET      1.00 0.085 0.10** 0.19***  0.032 -0.06 
BDINDP      1.00 0.11** 0.041 -0.090* -0.31***  
BDSIZE        1.00 0.078 -0.0010 -0.15***  
BDMEET        1.00 0.12** -0.16***  
DUALITY         1.00 -0.034 
BLOCKOWN          1.00 
INSIDEOWN           
INSTOWN           
LGTA           
ZFC           
SEGMENTS           
FOREIGN           
MARESTR           
GROWTH           
LITIGATION           
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively based on two-sided tests. 
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables 
 INSIDEOWN  INSTOWN LGTA ZFC SEGMENTS FOREIGN MARESTR GROWTH  LITIGATION  
ACINDP  -0.051 0.20***  0.067 0.016 0.0061 0.0034 0.043 0.024 0.010 
ACCEXP  -0.048 0.013 -0.050 0.046 -0.049 0.031 0.024 0.018 0.069 
NONACCEXP  0.016 0.14***  0.0034 0.022 0.040 0.025 0.070 0.093 0.0076 
ACSIZE -0.24***  0.15***  0.50***  -0.11** 0.32***  0.071 0.024 -0.11 -0.12** 
ACMEET  -0.099* 0.24***  0.19***  0.011 0.13** 0.12** 0.072 -0.10* 0.068 
BDINDP -0.30***  0.22***  0.22***  -0.11** 0.09* 0.061 0.15***  -0.011 -0.033 
BDSIZE  -0.15***  0.14***  0.56***  -0.043 0.35***  0.084 0.015 -0.080 -0.15***  
BDMEET -0.14***  -0.037 0.16***  -0.0029 0.14***  0.14***  0.045 0.058 0.073 
DUALITY 0.014 -0.18***  -0.21***  0.019 -0.027 -0.012 -0.053 -0.014 0.11** 
BLOCKOWN 0.64***  -0.035 -0.27***  0.12** -0.26***  -0.11** -0.096* 0.12** -0.012 
INSIDEOWN 1.00 -0.27***  -0.33***  0.016 -0.22***  -0.16***  -0.19***  0.21***  0.053 
INSTOWN  1.00 0.37***  -0.084 0.050 0.052 0.16***  -0.066 -0.057 
LGTA   1.00 -0.046 -0.076 -0.018 -0.00088 -0.032 -0.084 
ZFC    1.00 -0.076 -0.018 -0.00088 -0.032 -0.084 
SEGMENTS     1.00 0.061 0.094* -0.094* -0.21***  
FOREIGN      1.00 0.22***  -0.10* -0.045 
MARESTR       1.00 -0.021 -0.075 
GROWTH        1.00 0.012 
LITIGATION         1.00 
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The MW firms and control firms also exhibit differences in their financial 
variables.  The MW firms are more likely to be in higher financial distress (ZFC), 
undergoing either mergers, acquisitions, or restructuring (MARESTR), have more 
operating segments (SEGMENTS), and have foreign operations (FOREIGN) than the 
control firms (p < 0.05, one-tailed).  The MW firms and control firms do not differ 
significantly in size (LGTA), possibly due to the matching procedure as described above.  
There is also no evidence that the MW firms grow more rapidly in their net sales 
(GROWTH) or are less likely to operate in litigious industries (LITIGATION) than the 
control firms.  
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations.  In general, the audit committee and 
board variables are highly correlated.  This is not unexpected because the audit 
committee is a subset of the board, and board characteristics could simply reflect audit 
committee characteristics, or vice versa.  The correlation coefficients among the 
independent variables range from -0.33 (between INSIDEOWN and LGTA) to 0.64 
(between BLOCKOWN and INSIDEOWN).  The variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all 










Table 4: Logistic regression results on the incidence of MW  
 
Pr (MWF=1) = a + b1ACINDP + b2ACCEXP + b3NONACCEXP + b4ACSIZE + 
b5ACMEET + b6BDINDP + b7BDSIZE + b8BDMEET + b9DUALITY + 
b10BLOCK+ b11INSIDEOWN + b12INSTOWN + b13LGTA + b14ZFC + 
b15SEGMENTS + b16FOREIGN + b17GROWTH + b18MARESTR + 
b19LITIGATION + ε 
  Model 1a 





ACINDP - -0.34 -0.91 
ACCEXP - -1.84 -2.45*** 
NONACCEXP - -0.89 -1.54* 
ACSIZE - -0.44 -2.24** 
ACMEET - 0.078 1.55* 
BDINDP - -2.40 -2.22** 
BDSIZE + -0.027 -0.33 
BDMEET - -0.037 -0.92 
DUALITY - 0.19 1.02 
BLOCKOWN - -0.0059 -0.60 
INSIDEOWN - -0.017 -1.45* 
INSTOWN - 0.16 0.24 
LGTA - 0.070 0.29 
ZFC + 1.96 2.22** 
SEGMENTS + 0.32 3.06*** 
FOREIGN + 0.92 2.59*** 
MARESTR + 0.49 1.44* 
GROWTH + -0.085 -0.29 
LITIGATION - -2.26 -2.49*** 










***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests 
where signs are predicted, two-tailed tests otherwise. 
a The conditional logit model does not yield an intercept term. 
b See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables. The dependent variable is an indicator coded 
1 for MW firms and 0 for control firms.  
cThe pseudo R-squared is based on the McFadden's Likelihood Rati  Index. 
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Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for the model examining whether 
the effectiveness of the audit committee and board is negatively associated with the 
incidence of MW.26  The model is significant, as indicated by the Chi-squared of its 
likelihood ratio. The pseudo R-squared is 0.31, suggesting a high goodness-of-fit.  As 
predicted, the proportion of audit committee members with accounting financial expertise 
(ACCEXP) is negative and significant (p < 0.01, one tailed).  The proportion of audit 
committee members with nonaccounting financial expertise (NONACCEXP) is also 
negative but only marginally significant (p < 0.10, one-tailed).  These results suggest that 
higher financial expertise of the audit committee reduces th  likelihood of MW.  ACSIZE 
is negative and significant (p < 0.05, one-tailed), providing empirical support that firms 
with larger audit committees are more likely to have stronger internal controls.  Contrary 
to expectations, audit committee meeting frequency (ACMEET) is positive and 
marginally significant (p < 0.10, one-tailed).  One possible reason for this finding is that 
the audit committees of the MW firms may have anticipated or become aware of internal 
control problems prior to their disclosures, and hence, meet ore frequently before the 
disclosures of MW.   
 
Table 4 also shows that the independence of the board of directors (BDINDP), but 
not the independence of the audit committee (ACINDP), is negatively associated with the 
                                               
 
 
26 I also conduct sensitivity test by removing three firms in which the MW disclosed involve ineffective 
audit committees or boards, for example, the lack of a financial expert on the audit committee.  The results 
are the same as those with these firms in the sample.  For parsimonious reasons and for sensitivity checks, I 
also remove those variables that are found not to be significant in the model (i.e. BLOCKOWN, 
INSTOWN, LGTA, and GROWTH) and rerun the regression model.  The statistical significance levels of 
the governance variables remain unchanged.  
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incidence of MW (p < 0.05, one-tailed).  This finding is consistent with independent 
board members being more effective monitors of internal controls.  Neither board size 
(BDSIZE), board meeting frequency (BDMEET), or CEO duality (DUALITY) is 
significantly associated with the incidence of MW.  The level of shareholdings held by 
directors and management (INSIDEOWN) is negatively associated with the incidence of 
MW (p < 0.10, one-tailed), consistent with larger inside ownership resulting in more 
effective monitoring of internal controls.   
 
ZFC, SEGMENTS, and FOREIGN are positive and significant (p < 0.05, one-
tailed), suggesting that higher financial distress, more operating segments, and the 
presence of foreign operations all increase the likelihood of MW.  There is also some 
empirical support that firms undergoing merger, acquisition, or restructuring 
(MARESTR) are more likely to have MW (p < 0.10, one-tailed).  Last, LITIGATION is 
negative and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that operating in a litigious industry 
reduces the likelihood of MW.  
 
Overall, the results in this section provide some support for Hypothesis 1.  In the 
year before the MW detection, firms with weaker corporate governance structures are 
more likely to have MW.  Specifically, there is strong empirical evidence that firms with 
a lower proportion of audit committee members with accounting financial expertise, 
smaller audit committees, and a lower proportion of board members who are 
independent, are more likely to be associated with the incide e of MW.   There is also 
some empirical support that firms with a lower proportion of audit committee members 
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with nonaccounting financial expertise are more likely to have MW.  The lack of 
effectiveness in the audit committees and boards of directo s of MW firms raises the 
question of whether these individuals suffer reputational penalties as a result of internal 
control failures.  The next section presents the empirical results on whether these 
individuals suffer the loss of positions within the firm and the loss of outside 
directorships.  Because top management has responsibilities in ensuring proper internal 
controls, such reputational penalties for internal control failures should also extend to top 














Table 5: Descriptive statistics and univariate tests results on the (1) turnover of top management, audit committee 
members, and outside directors, and (2) loss of outside directorships 
 





Variable a Expected 
Sign 
Mean Median Mean Median t-statisticsb Wilcoxon Zc 
Financial and 
governance data 
       
STKPERF d N.A. 0.56 0.36 0.62 0.40 -0.65 1.56 
ZFC N.A. 0.091 0.0029 0.049 0.00040 2.10** 3.67*** 
RESTATE N.A. 0.77 1.00 0.15 0.00 15.2*** 11.9*** 
MGTAGE N.A. 53.3 54.0 53.7 54.33 -0.46 -0.32 
MGTTENURE N.A. 7.30 5.00 8.10 6.16 -1.19 -1.86* 
ACAGE N.A. 59.2 59.6 58.7 58.9 0.67 0.44 
ACTENURE N.A. 6.17 5.00 6.33 5.87 -0.38 0.83 
BDAGE N.A. 58.6 59.3 58.6 59.0 0.05 0.081 
BDTENURE N.A. 6.35 5.50 6.88 6.33 1.29 -1.76* 
Turnover data        
MGTTURNOVER + 0.51 1.00 0.31 0.00 3.89*** 3.81*** 
ACTURNOVER + 0.34 0.33 0.19 0.20 5.78*** 4.86*** 
BDTURNOVER + 0.37 0.33 0.24 0.20 5.68*** 4.97*** 
ACTURNOVER1  + 0.69 1.00 0.57 1.00 2.39*** 2.37*** 
BDTURNOVER1  + 0.83 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.67 0.66 
ACTURNOVER2  + 0.32 0.00 0.08 0.00 5.98*** 5.71*** 
BDTURNOVER2  + 0.33 0.00 0.10 0.00 5.39*** 5.20*** 
ACTURNOVER3  + 0.27 0.00 0.04 0.00 6.31*** 6.00*** 




Table 5 (continued) 
 





Variable a Expected 
Sign 
Mean Median Mean Median t-statisticsb Wilcoxon Zc 
Outside 
directorships data 
       
ACSEATBEF N.A. 0.96 0.75 0.84 0.66 1.31* 1.28** 
ACSEATAFT N.A. 0.77 0.66 0.82 0.66 -0.70 0.74 
ACSEATLOSS + 0.19 0.00 0.022 0.00 3.62*** 3.66*** 
BDSEATBEF N.A. 0.99 0.85 0.84 0.66 1.86** 1.70** 
BDSEATAFT N.A. 0.78 0.66 0.79 0.66 0.16 0.055 
BDSEATLOSS + 0.21 0.11 0.050 0.00 4.18*** 3.59*** 
***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests where signs are predicted, and two-
tailed tests otherwise. 
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables 
b A two-sample t-test is used to test for significant differences in means between the MW firms and control firms.  
c A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sample test is used to testwhether the observations in the MW firms and control fi ms are from populations with 
different distributions (i.e. whether the medians are diff rent between the two groups). 
d Because of extreme observations in this variable, I winsorize the lower tail observations at the 5th percentile value and the upper tail observations at the 





5.2 The Relation between the Incidence of MW and the Turnover of Top 
Management, Audit Committee Members and Board of Directors (Hypotheses 2a 
and 2c) 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics and univariate tes  results on the 
differences in financial, governance, and turnover data between the MW firms and 
control firms.  The parametric tests indicate that te MW firms and control firms do not 
differ in terms of financial performance.  The mean buy-and-hold returns over months -
12 to +12 relative to the disclosure of MW (STKPERF) are 0.56 and 0.62 for the MW 
firms and control firms, respectively, but this differenc  is not statistically significant.  
However, the MW firms are in higher financial distress than the control firms, as 
indicated by the ZFC measure (p < 0.05, two-tailed).  Not surpri ingly, the MW firms are 
more likely to restate their earnings than the control firms. Specifically, 77 percent of the 
MW firms and 15 percent of the control firms announce at lst one earnings restatement 
from the year before the MW to the second year following the MW detection (p < 0.01, 
two-tailed).   
 
With regards to top management and director data, the parametric tests show that 
the MW firms and control firms are not significantly different in either the mean age and 
tenure of their top management (MGTAGE, MGTTENURE), audit committee members 
(ACAGE, ACTENURE) and outside directors (BDAGE, BDTENURE).  However, the 
non-parametric tests show that the mean tenures of the top management and outside 
directors in the control firms are significantly greater than those of the MW firms (p < 
0.10, two-tailed).  
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Looking at the turnover data, top management turnover (MGTTURNOVER) is 
significantly higher for the MW firms (p < 0.01, one-tailed).  Specifically, 51 percent of 
the MW firms and 31 percent of the control firms have at le st one individual holding the 
positions of CEO, Chairman, and/ or President in the year b fore the MW detection leave 
the firm within two years of the MW detection.  The pro ortion of audit committee 
members (ACTURNOVER) and outside directors (BDTURNOVER) who leave the firm 
within two years of the MW detection is also significantly higher for the MW firms than 
for the control firms (p < 0.01, one-tailed).  Specifically, 34 percent of the audit 
committee members (37 percent of the outside directors) in the MW firms leave the firm 
within two years of the MW detection, compared to 19 percent of the audit committee 
members (24 percent of the outside directors) in the control firms.  
 
The table also shows the univariate comparisons of the turnover rate of audit 
committee member and outside directors using the indicator v riables defined earlier.  
ACTURNOVER1, ACTURNOVER2, and ACTURNOVER3, are indicator variables 
coded 1 if at least one audit committee member, at least half of the audit committee 
members, and more than half of the audit committee members, respectively, leave the 
firms within two years of the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.  BDTURNOVER1, 
BDTURNOVER2, and BDTURNOVER3 are indicator variables defined similarly for the 
outside directors.   
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The results using the indicator variables are consistent with the turnover data 
using proportions.  Sixty-nine percent of the MW firms, compared to 57 percent of the 
control firms, have at least one audit committee member leaving the firm within two 
years of the MW detection.  Also, 32 percent (33 percent) of the MW firms and 8 percent 
(10 percent) of the control firms have at least half the audit committee members (outside 
directors) leave the firm within two years of the MW detection.  Last, 27 percent (25 
percent) of the MW firms and 4 percent (5.4 percent) of the control firms have more than 
half of the audit committee members (outside directors) leave the firm within two years 
of the MW detection.  All these differences in turnover b tween the MW firms and 
control firms are significant (p < 0.01, one-tailed). 
 
The univariate results show that top management, audit committee members, and 
outside directors in the MW firms experience turnover at a rate greater than their 
counterparts in the control firms.  I test these results more rigorously using logistic 
regression models.  Table 6 presents the Pearson correlati ns of the independent 
variables.  Just as the results of examining the incidene of MW, the correlation 
coefficients among the independent variables range from -0.33 (between INSTOWN and 
LGTA) to 0.64 (between BLOCKOWN and INSIDEOWN).  The correlation coefficient 
between MWF and RESTATE is also high at 0.62.  The VIFs of all the independent 
variables in each of the regression models examined in this section are under 2.5, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern.   
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Table 6: Pearson correlation coefficients among independent variables 
 
Variablesa MWF  STKPERF ZFC RESTATE LGTA  MARESTR DUALITY  BLOCKOWN  INSIDEOWN  
MWF 1.00 -0.033 0.10** 0.62***  0.017 0.11** 0.070 -0.081 -0.084 
STKPERF  1.00 -0.030 -0.021 -0.13** -0.076 -0.033 0.13***  0.081 
ZFC   1.00 0.087* -0.046 -0.00088 0.018 0.12** 0.016 
RESTATE    1.00 0.12** 0.091* 0.00054 -0.050 -0.046 
LGTA     1.00 0.13** -0.21***  -0.27***  -0.33***  
MARESTR      1.00 -0.052 -0.096* -0.19***  
DUALITY       1.00 -0.034 0.014 
BLOCKOWN        1.00 0.64***  
INSIDEOWN         1.00 
INSTOWN          
MGTAGE          
MGTTENURE          
ACAGE          
ACTENURE          
BDAGE          
BDTENURE          
ACSEATBEF          
BDSEATBEF          
(continued on next page) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Variablesa INSTOWN MGTAGE  MGTTENURE  ACAGE ACTENURE BDAGE BDTENURE ACSEATBEF BDSEATBEF 
MWF -0.058 -0.023 -0.062 0.035 -0.020 0.0026 -0.067 0.068 0.096* 
STKPERF -0.18***  -0.0058 0.043 0.0023 -0.041 -0.0045 -0.055 -0.0088 -0.067 
ZFC -0.084 -0.088* -0.080 -0.074 -0.11**  -0.070 -0.099* -0.023 -0.027 
RESTATE 0.070 0.037 -0.051 0.0068 0.0017 -0.0036 -0.036 0.049 0.070 
LGTA 0.36 0.16***  -0.025 0.14***  0.13 0.19***  0.13***  0.26***  0.34***  
MARESTR 0.15***  -0.092* -0.17***  -0.067 -0.10** -0.052 -0.15***  - - 
DUALITY -0.18***  -0.036 -0.17***  -0.040 -0.015 -0.056 0.010 - - 
BLOCKOW
N 
-0.035 -0.053 0.19***  -0.12** -0.11** -0.14***  -0.049 - - 
INSIDEOWN -0.27***  -0.045 0.23***  -0.12** -0.11** -0.16***  -0.023 - - 
INSTOWN 1.00 0.0077 -0.087* 0.080 0.068 0.10** 0.0062 - - 
MGTAGE  1.00 0.43***  - - - - - - 
MGTTENUR
E 
  1.00 - - - - - - 
ACAGE    1.00 0.44***  - - 0.074 - 
ACTENURE     1.00 - - -0.070 - 
BDAGE      1.00 0.43***  - 0.025 
BDTENURE       1.00 - -0.11** 
ACSEATBEF        1.00 0.81 
BDSEATBEF         1.00 
***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively based on two-sided tests. 




Table 7: Logistic regression results on the turnover of top management  
 
Pr (MGTTURNOVER=1)  = a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4RESTATE + 
b5LGTA + b6MARESTR + b7MGTAGE + 
b8MGTTENURE + b9DUALITY + b10BLOCKOWN + 










Intercept  ? -1.46 2.22 
MWF + 0.55 3.54* 
STKPERF - -0.33 6.34** 
ZFC + 0.41 0.49 
RESTATE + 0.27 0.87 
LGTA ? 0.0020 0.0007 
MARESTR + 0.54   4.90** 
MGTAGE + 0.018 1.25 
MGTTENURE - -0.064 8.06*** 
DUALITY + 0.038 0.045 
BLOCKOWN + -0.0020 0.067 
INSIDEOWN + -0.0015 0.025 
INSTOWN + 0.083 0.027 
Likelihood ratio  
(p-value)  






***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests 
where signs are predicted, two-tailed tests otherwise. 
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables.  The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable that is coded 1 if any individual holding the title of CEO, Chairman, and/or President in the year 
before the MW detection, leaves the firm within two years of the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.   
 
 
Table 7 presents the logistic regression results examining the relation between the 
incidence of MW and top management turnover.  The dependent variable, 
MGTTURNOVER, is coded 1 if at least one individual holding the positions of CEO, 
Chairman, and/ or President in the year before the MW detection leaves the firm within 
two years of the MW detection.  Just as before, MWF is an indicator variable coded 1 for 
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MW firms 0 for control firms.  The model is significant, as indicated by the Chi-squared 
value of the likelihood ratio.   
 
Consistent with the results in the univariate tests, MWF is positive and marginally 
significant (p < 0.10, one-tailed).  This result provides some empirical support that the 
MW firms are more likely to experience turnover of at least one top management 
following the MW detection compared to the control firms, and is consistent with 
reputational penalties being imposed on top management subsequent to the discovery of 
MW.  Stock performance (STKPERF) is negative and significant (p < 0.05, one-tailed), 
consistent with the interpretation that top management is more likely to leave the firm as 
a result of poor financial performance.  Among the other control variables, the presence 
of mergers, acquisitions, or restructuring (MARESTR) and shorter top management 
tenures (MGTTENURE) also increase the likelihood of top management turnover (p < 





Table 8: Logistic regression results on the turnover of audit committee members  
 
Pr (ACTURNOVER1/ACTURNOVER2/ACTURNOVER3=1) = a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4RESTATE + b5LGTA + 
b6MARESTR + b7ACAGE + b8ACTENURE + b9DUALITY + b10BLOCKOWN + b11INSIDEOWN + b12INSTOWN + ε 
***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests where signs are predicted, two-tailed tests otherwise.   




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 












Intercept ? -1.42 1.43 -3.97 6.82*** -6.52 13.3*** 
MWF + 0.47 2.66* 1.67 18.3*** 1.97 17.3*** 
STKPERF - 0.011 0.0076 -0.20 1.47 -0.47 5.20** 
ZFC + 0.26 0.18 1.54 5.58** 1.04 2.20 
RESTATE + -0.083 0.081 -0.20 0.32 0.0010 0.00 
LGTA + 0.19 6.48** 0.082 0.78 0.044 0.18 
MARESTR +   0.39 2.70 0.23 0.54 0.37 1.07 
ACAGE + 0.0044 0.055 0.0099 0.17 0.043 2.49 
ACTENURE - 0.0088 0.080 0.030 0.69 0.016 0.15 
DUALITY + 0.29 1.78 0.51 3.41* 0.69 4.43** 
BLOCKOWN + 0.0019 0.068 -0.0059 0.36 0.00013 0.0002 
INSIDEOWN + -0.012 1.77 -0.0045 0.11 -0.0013 0.0080 
INSTOWN + -0.063 0.017 0.34 0.29 0.20 0.076 
Likelihood ratio  
(p-value)  















Table 8 presents the logistic regression results on the relation between the 
incidence of MW and the turnover of audit committee members.  The dependent 
variables in Models 1, 2, and 3 are indicator variables that are coded 1 if at least one audit 
committee member (ACTURNOVER1), at least half of the audit committee members 
(ACTURNOVER2), and more than half of the audit committee members 
(ACTURNOVER3), respectively, leave the firm within two years of the MW detection, 
and 0 otherwise.  All the models are significant, as indicated by the Chi-squared values of 
their likelihood ratios.  
 
MWF is positive and significant in Models 2 and 3 (p < 0.01, one-tailed), 
providing empirical support that the audit committee members in the MW firms are more 
likely to leave the firm following the MW detection than their counterparts in the control 
firms.  In Model 1, MWF is also positive and significant, albeit at a lower significance 
level (p < 0.10, one-tailed).  ZFC is positive and significant in Model 2 (p < 0.05, one-
tailed), and STKPERF is negative and significant in Model 3 (p < 0.05, one-tailed), 
suggesting that poor financial health increases the likelihood of audit committee members 
leaving the firm.  DUALITY is positive and significant in Models 2 and 3 (p < 0.10 and p 
< 0.05, respectively, one-tailed) and LGTA is positive and significant in Model 1 (p < 
0.05, one-tailed), suggesting that the turnover rate of auditcommittee members is higher 
for firms in which the CEO and Chairman positions are held by different individuals and 





Table 9: Logistic regression results on the turnover of outside directors  
 
    Pr (BDTURNOVER1/BDTURNOVER2/BDTURNOVER3=1) = a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4RESTATE + b5LGTA + 
b6MARESTR + b7BDAGE + b8BDTENURE + b9DUALITY + b10BLOCKOWN + b11INSIDEOWN + b12INSTOWN + ε 
     ***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively, based on one-tailed tests where signs are predicted, two-tailed tests otherwise.   




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 












Intercept ? 1.24 0.53 -2.40 2.04 -5.45 7.29*** 
MWF + 0.021 0.0034 1.36 13.5*** 1.99 18.7*** 
STKPERF - -0.10 0.42 -0.28 2.91* -0.45 4.80** 
ZFC + 0.51 0.36 1.33 4.57** 1.51 4.81** 
RESTATE + 0.014 0.0016 -0.047 0.018 -0.49 1.48 
LGTA + 0.37 12.5*** 0.13 2.29 0.10 0.92 
MARESTR + 0.74 6.44** 0.29 0.90 0.45 1.50 
BDAGE + -0.042 2.26 -0.016 0.34 0.016 0.26 
BDTENURE - 0.034 0.68 -0.0091 0.053 -0.018 0.15 
DUALITY + 0.54 3.19* 0.41 2.70* 0.42 2.56 
BLOCKOWN + 0.0067 0.48 0.0015 0.026 0.0054 0.25 
INSIDEOWN + -0.0018 0.025 -0.0019 0.025 0.0048 0.11 
INSTOWN + -1.11 3.18* 0.16 0.067 0.97 1.75 
Likelihood ratio  
(p-value)  















Table 9 presents the logistic regression results by repeating the above analyses, 
but focusing on the turnover of outside directors.  The dependent variables in Models 1, 
2, and 3 are indicator variables that are coded 1 if at leas one outside director 
(BDTURNOVER1), at least half of the outside directors (BDTURNOVER2), and more 
than half of the outside directors (BDTURNOVER3), respectively, in the year before the 
MW detection leave the firm within two years of the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.  All 
the models are significant, as indicated by the Chi-squared values of their likelihood 
ratios.  
 
The results are similar to those of the turnover of audit committee members.  The 
variable MWF is positive and significant in Models 2 and 3 (p < 0.01, one-tailed), 
suggesting that the incidence of MW increases the likelihood of outside directors leaving 
the firm within two years of the MW detection.  The variable MWF is not significant in 
Model 1.  The fact that MWF is very significant in Models 2 and 3, but not significant in 
Model 1, provides compelling evidence of the effect that MW detection has on the 
outside directors.   
 
In Models 2 and 3, STKPERF is negative and significant (p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, 
respectively, one-tailed), and ZFC is positive and significant (p < 0.05, one-tailed), 
consistent with poor financial health increasing the likelihood of outside directors 
turnover.  Consistent with the results in audit committee turnover, LGTA is positive and 
significant in Model 1 (p < 0.01, one-tailed) and DUALITY is positive and marginally 
significant in Models 1 and 2 (p < 0.10, one-tailed).  Contrary to expectations, 
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INSTOWN is negative and significant in Model 1, suggesting that institutional ownership 
is negatively associated with the likelihood of outside dir ctors turnover.  Last, 
MARESTR is positive and significant in Model 1 (p < 0.05, one-tailed), consistent with 
mergers, acquisitions, or restructuring increasing the likelihood of outside directors 
turnover.   
 
The results thus far have focused on the statistical significance of MWF.  
However, it is also important to evaluate the economic significance of MWF to examine 
the practical effects of the incidence of MW.  This canbe achieved by computing the 
increase in the probability of the turnover of these individuals as a result of the incidence 
of MW.  In the top management turnover model, the results (not tabulated) show that the 
incidence of MW increases the probability of turnover of at least one of the top three 
management positions by 0.13.  I compute similar probability for the turnover of more 
than half the audit committee members (ACTURNOVER3) and outside directors 
(BDTURNOVER3).  The results (not tabulated) show that e probability for the 
turnover of more than half the audit committee members and outside directors increases 
by 0.19 and 0.20, respectively, as a result of the incidence of MW.  These results suggest 
that the incidence of MW has a great economic impact on the turnover of those 
individuals charged with internal control monitoring.  
 
Overall the univariate test and regression results provide some support for 
Hypothesis 2a in that the incidence of MW increases the likelihood of turnover of top 
management.  The results provide strong support for Hypothesis 2c in that the incidence 
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of MW increases the likelihood of turnover of audit committee members and outside 
directors.  The turnover of these individuals is consistent with reputational penalties 
being imposed on these individuals within the firm for inter al control failures.  If 
internal control failures reveal the lower quality of the audit committees and outside 
directors in monitoring, and the labor market can infer this quality, then reputational 
penalties can extend to the loss of the outside directorships.  The next section presents the 
empirical results on whether the audit committee members and outside directors in the 
MW firms indeed suffer greater losses in outside directorships than their counterparts in 
the control firms.  
 
5.3 The Relation between the Incidence of MW and the Loss in Outside 
Directorships (Hypotheses 2b) 
The descriptive statistics on the outside directorships held by the audit committee 
and outside directors in both the MW firms and control fi ms are presented in Table 5.  
An interesting finding is that the outside directors of the MW firms hold significantly 
more outside directorships than their counterparts in the control firms prior to the MW 
detection (p < 0.05, one tailed for BDSEATBEF).  It also appears that the audit 
committee members of the MW firms hold more outside directorships than their 
counterparts in the control firms prior to the MW detection (p < 0.10, one-tailed for 
ACSEATBEF).  These results suggest that more outside directorships by the audit 
committee members and outside directors may reduce their commitment and 
effectiveness in monitoring the firm, which may in turn explain the greater incidence of 
MW in these firms.   
 103 
 
The descriptive statistics on ACSEATLOSS and BDSEATLOSS show that both 
the audit committee members and outside directors of the MW firms and control firms 
lose directorships during the three-year period surrounding the MW detection.  One 
possible reason for this result is the greater frequency of ompanies going private 
subsequent to the passage of SOX, which results in outside directors losing directorships 
in public companies.  Another possible reason is that the high litigation costs facing 
outside directors subsequent to SOX may have caused them to give up their directorships 
voluntarily in order to avoid such costs.   
 
The descriptive statistics show that the audit committee m mbers of the MW 
firms and control firms lose an average of 0.19 and 0.022 outside directorships, 
respectively (ACSEATLOSS).  The outside directors of the MW firms and control firms 
lose an average of 0.21 and 0.05 outside directorships, respectively (BDSEATLOSS).  
Both the differences in ACSEATLOSS and BDSEATLOSS between th  MW firms and 
control firms are significant (p < 0.01, one-tailed).  Finally, in the second year following 
the MW detection, the mean number of outside directorships held by audit committee 
members (ACSEATAFT) and outside directors (BDSEATAFT) in the MW firms and 










Table 10: OLS regression results on the loss of outside directorships  
 
ACSEATLOSS (BDSEATLOSS)  = a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + 
b4RESTATE + b5LGTA + b6ACSEATBEF (BDSEATBEF) + b7ACAGE 




Model 1 Model 2 
Variable a  Coefficient 
Estimates 
t-statistics b Coefficient 
Estimates 
t-statistics b 
Intercept ? -0.21 -1.13 -0.22 -1.06 
MWF a + 0.18 3.51*** 0.14 3.63*** 
STKPERF - -0.00091 -0.04 0.0062 0.33 
ZFC + 0.083 0.93 0.077 1.19 
RESTATE + -0.066 -1.22 -0.041 -1.01 
LGTA + -0.029 -2.27** -0.014 -1.48 
ACSEATBEF + 0.25 5.94***   
ACAGE + 0.0022 0.70   
ACTENURE - 0.012 2.47**   
BDSEATBEF +   0.26 9.88*** 
BDAGE +   0.0015 0.45 









***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests 
where signs are predicted, two-tailed tests otherwise.   
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables. The dependent variables, ACSEATLOSS 
(Model 1) and BDSEATLOSS (Model 2) represent the number of outside directorships in other public 
companies lost by the audit committee members and outside directors, respectively, from the year before 
the MW detection to the second year following the MW detection. 
b The Breusch-Pagan test shows the presence of heteroskedasticity. Hence, the t-statistics that are robust to 








Table 10 shows the OLS regression results on the relation between the incidence 
of MW and the loss of outside directorships by audit committee members (Model 1) and 
outside directors (Model 2).  The dependent variables in Models 1 and 2 represent the 
loss in outside directorships by the audit committee members and outside directors, 
respectively, from the year before the MW detection to the second year following the 
MW detection.  An interesting finding from the regression results is that the adjusted R-
squared for both models are high at 30 percent and 24 percent, suggesting a very high 
goodness-of-fit for both models.  
 
Consistent with the results in the univariate tests, MWF is positive and significant 
in both models (p < 0.01, one-tailed), suggesting that the incidence of MW increases the 
number of outside directorships lost by both audit committee members and outside 
directors.   ACSEATBEF and BDSEATBEF are both positive and significant (p < 0.01, 
one-tailed), consistent with the loss of outside directorships increasing with the number 
of outside directorships held before the MW detection.  Contrary to expectations, 
ACTENURE is positive and significant in Model 1 (p < 0.05, one-tailed) and 
BDTENURE is positive and significant in Model 2 (p < 0.05, one-tailed).  This result 
suggests that longer tenures of the audit committee members and outside directors on the 
board increase the number of outside directorships lost by these individuals.  One 
possible explanation for this finding is that longer tenures increase the bond and 
commitment of these individuals to the firm, which in turn increases the likelihood of 
them losing or giving up directorships in other firms as opposed to the MW firms.  
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As a whole, the results in this section support Hypothesis 2b and complement the 
findings in the previous section.  The reputational penalties imposed on audit committee 
members and outside directors for internal control failures extend from the loss of 
positions in the MW firms to the loss of outside directorships in other public companies.   
In the next section, I present the empirical results on whether the reputational penalties 
faced by top management, audit committee members, and outsie directors, increase with 
the severity, pervasiveness, and persistence of the MW. 
 
5.4 The Relation between the Severity, Pervasiveness, and Persistence of MW, and 
the Reputational Penalties of Top Management, Audit Committe Members, and 
Outside Directors (3a, 3b) 
Panel A of Table 11 provides the descriptive statistics and univariate test results 
on the turnover and loss in outside directorship data, strtified by the severity (SEVERE), 
pervasiveness (PERVADE), and persistence (PERSIST) of the firm’s MW.   For 
PERVADE, I classify the MW firms based on whether the number of different categories 
of MW the firm has is less than the median of all MW firms, or greater than or equal to 
the median of all the MW firms.  I use all the turnover and loss in outside directorship 
variables from Sections 5.2 and 5.3, except for ACTURNOVER1 and BDTURNOVER1, 
because the earlier results provide little empirical support that the turnover of audit 
committee members and outside directors based on these mea ures is sensitive to the 
incidence of MW. 
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Table 11: Relation between the severity, pervasiveness, and persistence of MW and the reputational penalties on top 
management, audit committee members, and outside directors 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
 
















Turnover data           
MGTTURNOVER + 0.65 0.40 3.40***  0.62 0.39 3.16***  0.64 0.45 2.40***  
ACTURNOVER + 0.41 0.29 2.65***  0.36 0.31 0.98 0.36 0.33 0.52 
BDTURNOVER + 0.44 0.32 2.98***  0.39 0.35 1.20 0.39 0.36 0.69 
ACTURNOVER2  + 0.40 0.26 2.03** 0.36 0.28 1.22 0.39 0.29 1.29* 
BDTURNOVER2  + 0.40 0.27 1.89** 0.34 0.31 0.42 0.37 0.31 0.83 
ACTURNOVER3  + 0.32 0.23 1.37* 0.30 0.24 0.81 0.37 0.23 1.91** 
BDTURNOVER3  + 0.34 0.19 2.35***  0.26 0.23 0.51 0.29 0.23 0.85 
Outside 
directorships data 
          
ACSEATLOSS + 0.29 0.12 2.30***  0.23 0.16 1.03 0.17 0.20 -0.24 
BDSEATLOSS + 0.27 0.16 1.80** 0.26 0.15 1.88** 0.24 0.20 0.49 
***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests. 
a SEVERE is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if the firm has one or more severe MW, and 0 otherwise.  Severe MW is defined in APPENDIX C.   
b PERVADE is the total number of different categories of MW that a MW firm has.  I classify the MW firms based on whether PERVADE is less than the 
median of all MW firms, or greater than or equal to the median of all MW firms.  
c PERSIST is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if MW are not remediated within two years of the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.  
d See APPENDIX B for definitions of variables. 









Table 11 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression results 
 
 Management 
turnover  a 
Audit committee turnover  a Outside directors turnover a Audit committee 
loss of outside 
directorships a 
Outside directors 
loss of outside 
directorships a 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 






















t-stats c Coeff. 
Est. 
t-stats c 
               
SEVERE 0.63 1.90 0.92 4.10** 0.67 1.97 0.93 4.27** 1.13 5.34** 0.17 2.27** 0.084 1.51* 
PERVADE 0.11 1.77 -0.085 1.09 -0.094 1.16 -0.11 1.87 -0.066 0.55 0.0010 0.09 0.011 1.14 
PERSIST 0.27 0.36 0.40 0.89 0.70 2.50 0.30 0.48 0.15 0.10 -0.067 -0.90 -0.0095 -0.02 









































***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests  
a Model 1 repeats the analyses in Table 8 by replacing MWF with SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST.  Models 2 and 3 repeat th  analyses in Models 2 and 3 
of Table 8 by replacing MWF with SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST. Models 4 and 5 repeat the analyses in Models 2 and 3 of Table 9 by replacing MWF 
with SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST. Models 6 and 7 repeat th  analyses in Models 1 and 2 of Table 10 by replacing MWF with SEVERE, PERVADE, and 
PERSIST. 
b SEVERE is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if the firm has one or more severe MW, and 0 otherwise.  Severe MW is defined in APPENDIX C. PERVADE 
is the total number of different categories of MW that a MW firm has.  PERSIST is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if MW are not remediated within two 
years from the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.  
c The Breusch-Pagan test shows the presence of heteroskedasticity. Hence, the t-statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity are computed.  
d Psuedo R-squared values are given for the case of logistic model and adjusted R-squared values for the case of OLS. 
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The panel shows that MW firms that have one or more sev re MW suffer 
significantly higher turnover of top management, audit committee members, and outside 
directors, than MW firms that do not (p < 0.05, one-tailed, for all variables except 
ACTURNOVER3, in which p < 0.10, one-tailed).  Audit committee members and outside 
directors in firms that have one or more severe MW also suffer greater loss in outside 
directorships than their counterparts in firms that do have severe MW (p < 0.05, one-
tailed).   Although firms that have more pervasive MW experience greater turnover of top 
management than firms that do not (p < 0.01, one-tailed), the turnover of audit committee 
members and outside directors between the two groups of firms are not statistically 
different.  Outside directors in firms that have more pervasive MW also experience 
greater loss in outside directorships than their counterparts in firms that have less 
pervasive MW (p < 0.05, one-tailed).  Last, the univariate test results show that firms 
with more persistent MW experience greater turnover of top management than firms with 
less persistent MW (p < 0.01, one-tailed).  There is also some evidence that these firms 
experience greater turnover of audit committee members (p < 0.10, one-tailed, for 
ACTURNOVER2 and p < 0.05, one tailed for ACTURNOVER3).  
 
I test more rigorously the relation between the severity, pervasiveness, and 
persistence of MW, and the reputational penalties of top management, audit committee 
members and outside directors.  I repeat the regression analyses in Tables 7 to 10 by 
replacing the variable MWF with SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST.  Hence, the 
regression tests are now performed on the 184 firms with MW.  For brevity, Panel B of 
Table 11 only shows the results for SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST.  For the same 
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reasons mentioned earlier, I do not perform regression tests using ACTURNOVER1 and 
BDTURNOVER1.  The panel shows that Models 1 to 5 are significant, as indicated by 
the Chi-squared values of their likelihood ratios.  The R-squared values for all the models 
range from 0.16 to 0.41, suggesting high goodness-of-fit for the models.   
 
Consistent with the univariate test results, firms that have one or more severe MW 
are more likely to experience turnover of audit committee m mbers (p < 0.05, one-tailed 
in Model 2) and outside directors (p < 0.05, one-tailed, in Models 4 and 5).  SEVERE is 
significant in Model 6 (p < 0.05, one-tailed) and marginally significant in Model 7 (p < 
0.10, one-tailed), providing some support that the severity of the firm’s MW is positively 
associated with the loss in the outside directorships of audit committee members and 
outside directors.  PERVADE and PERSIST are not statistically significant in any of the 
models based on conventional levels.   
 
Overall, the results in this section and in two preceding sections are consistent 
with the interpretation that the managerial labor market imposes reputational penalties on 
top management, audit committee members, and outside directors for internal control 
failures.  These individuals are more likely to leave the firm within two years of the MW 
detection.  Audit committee members and outside directors in MW firms also lose more 
outside directorships subsequent to the MW detection than their counterparts in firms 
without internal control weaknesses.  Further analyses show that the turnover of audit 
committee members and outside directors, and their loss in outside directorships, increase 
with the severity of the firm’s MW.  In the next section, I present the empirical results on 
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whether there is an overall improvement in the governance structures of the MW firms.  
Specifically, I examine whether the effectiveness of the audit committee and board of 
directors of the MW firms improve after the MW detection.   
 
5.5 The Relation between the Incidence of MW and Improvement in Corporate 
Governance Structures (Hypothesis 4) 
Panels A and B of Table 12 present the univariate comparisons of the changes in 
audit committee and overall board characteristics, respectively, from the year before the 
MW detection up to the second year following the MW detection.  Columns 1 to 4 show 
the governance characteristic for the year relative to the year of MW detection (Year t).  
Columns 5, 6, and 7 show the change in each governance characteristic from Year t-1 to 
Year t, Year t+1, Year t+2, respectively.  Column 8 shows that the t-statistics for the 
change in the governance characteristic from Year t-1 to Year t+2.  A high t-statistic 








Table 12: Univariate comparisons of the changes in audit committee and overall board characteristics from the year before the 
MW detection up to the second year following the MW detection 
 
     Panel A: Audit committee characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variablea Firm Year t-1 Year t Year 
t+1 











ACINDP MW 0.72 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.12 0.18 0.18 5.72*** 
 Control 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.076 0.087 0.11 3.92*** 
 (t-stats)b -2.23** -1.52* -0.17 -0.91 1.23 2.27** 1.69**  
ACCEXP MW 0.14 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.068 0.098 0.13 7.98*** 
 Control 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.026 0.054 0.086 6.42*** 
 (t-stats)b -2.68*** -0.62 -0.56 -0.41 3.43*** 2.41*** 2.17**  
NONACCEXP MW 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.66 -0.003 0.012 0.0029 0.16 
 Control 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.0099 0.0035 0.0096 0.65 
 (t-stats)b -1.18 -1.69** -0.90 -1.50* -0.74 0.40 -0.28  
ACSIZE MW 3.41 3.60 3.63 3.61 0.195 0.22 0.21 3.30*** 
 Control 3.60 3.60 3.61 3.67 -0.005 0.0054 0.071 1.30* 
 (t-stats)b -2.16** 0.06 0.23 -0.58 3.26*** 2.93*** 1.68**  
ACMEET MW 6.36 8.16 12.2 11.1 1.80 5.88 4.72 11.5*** 
 Control 6.00 7.04 7.99 8.04 1.04 1.99 2.04 9.45*** 
 (t-stats)b 1.22 3.19*** 6.59*** 6.62*** 2.41*** 6.25*** 5.74***  
Columns 1 to 4 show the governance characteristic for the year relative to the year of MW detection (Year t).  Columns 5, 6, and 7 show the change in each 
governance characteristic from Year t-1 to Year t, Year t+1, Year t+2, respectively.  Column 8 shows the t-statistics for the change in the governance 
characteristic from Year t-1 to Year t+2.   
***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests. 
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of variables  





Table 12: Univariate comparisons of the changes in audit committee and overall board characteristics from the year before the 
MW detection up to the second year following the MW detection 
 
     Panel A: Audit committee characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variablea Firm Year t-1 Year t Year 
t+1 











ACINDP MW 0.72 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.12 0.18 0.18 5.72*** 
 Control 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.076 0.087 0.11 3.92*** 
 (t-stats)b -2.23** -1.52* -0.17 -0.91 1.23 2.27** 1.69**  
ACCEXP MW 0.14 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.068 0.098 0.13 7.98*** 
 Control 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.026 0.054 0.086 6.42*** 
 (t-stats)b -2.68*** -0.62 -0.56 -0.41 3.43*** 2.41*** 2.17**  
NONACCEXP MW 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.66 -0.003 0.012 0.0029 0.16 
 Control 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.0099 0.0035 0.0096 0.65 
 (t-stats)b -1.18 -1.69** -0.90 -1.50* -0.74 0.40 -0.28  
ACSIZE MW 3.41 3.60 3.63 3.61 0.195 0.22 0.21 3.30*** 
 Control 3.60 3.60 3.61 3.67 -0.005 0.0054 0.071 1.30* 
 (t-stats)b -2.16** 0.06 0.23 -0.58 3.26*** 2.93*** 1.68**  
ACMEET MW 6.36 8.16 12.2 11.1 1.80 5.88 4.72 11.5*** 
 Control 6.00 7.04 7.99 8.04 1.04 1.99 2.04 9.45*** 
 (t-stats)b 1.22 3.19*** 6.59*** 6.62*** 2.41*** 6.25*** 5.74***  
Columns 1 to 4 show the governance characteristic for the year relative to the year of MW detection (Year t).  Columns 5, 6, and 7 show the change in each 
governance characteristic from Year t-1 to Year t, Year t+1, Year t+2, respectively.  Column 8 shows the t-statistics for the change in the governance 
characteristic from Year t-1 to Year t+2.   
***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests. 
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of variables  
b A two-sample t-test is used to test for significant differences in means between the MW firms and control firms.  
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Table 12 (continued) 
 
     Panel B: Overall board characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variablea Firm Year t-1 Year t Year 
t+1 











BDINDP MW 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.047 0.094 0.11 10.1*** 
 Control 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.018 0.037 0.052 4.93*** 
 (t-stats)b -3.83*** -2.47*** -0.64 -0.92 2.73*** 3.63*** 3.71***  
BDSIZE MW 8.20 8.30 8.22 8.21 0.098 0.016 0.0054 0.04 
 Control 8.22 8.37 8.37 8.45 0.15 0.15 0.23 2.19** 
 (t-stats)b -0.07 -0.31 -0.69 -1.07 -0.47 -0.92 -1.33*  
BDMEET MW 7.85 8.73 9.93 9.73 0.88 2.08 1.89 4.46*** 
 Control 7.50 7.48 7.65 7.85 0 0.16 0.36 1.32* 
 (t-stats)b 0.83 2.81*** 4.19*** 4.08*** 2.17** 3.59*** 3.01***  
DUALITY MW 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.58 -0.016 -0.005 0.13 1.53* 
 Control 0.36 0.39 0.44 0.42 0.027 0.076 0.060 1.99** 
 (t-stats)b 1.34* 0.95 0.21 2.16** -0.75 -1.25 0.75  
Columns 1 to 4 show the governance characteristic for the year relative to the year of MW detection (Year t).  Columns 5, 6, and 7 show the change in each 
governance characteristic from Year t-1 to Year t, Year t+1, Year t+2, respectively.  Column 8 shows the t-statistics for the change in the governance 
characteristic from Year t-1 to Year t+2.   
***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests. 
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of variables 
b A two-sample t-test is used to test for significant differences in means between the MW firms and control firms.  
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Panel A shows that, in the year prior to the MW detection, MW firms have lower 
proportion of audit committee members who are independent (p < 0.05, one-tailed), 
lower proportion of audit committee members with accounting financial expertise (p < 
0.01, one-tailed), and smaller audit committees (p < 0.05, one-tailed) than the control 
firms.  Both the MW firms and control firms show improvement in the independence of 
their audit committees, and by the first year following the MW detection, the MW firms 
and control firms no longer exhibit significant difference in the independence of their 
audit committees.   
 
Panel A also shows that the MW firms are prompt in adding irectors with 
accounting financial expertise to their audit committees.  A  such, by the year of the MW 
detection, the MW firms and control firms no longer differ in terms of the proportion of 
audit committee members with accounting financial expertise.  An intriguing finding is 
that both the MW firms and control firms do not improve th proportion of audit 
committee members with nonaccounting financial expertise, despite the fact that the 
definition of financial expertise in the final version of SOX includes such financial 
expertise.  Hence, it appears that both the MW firms and co trol firms value accounting 
financial expertise of their audit committee members more than nonaccounting financial 
expertise.  
 
The panel also shows a remarkable difference in the speed in which the MW firms 
and control firms increase the size of their audit committees.  While the control firms 
show little expansion in their audit committees, the MW firms increase the size of their 
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audit committees, such that by the year of the MW detection, the size of audit committees 
is no longer significantly different between the two grups of firms.  A plausible 
interpretation for this finding is that the MW firms believe that a larger audit committee 
is more effective in resolving internal control issues and are promptly devoting more 
resources to the audit committee during the year of the MW detection.  Nonetheless, the 
audit committee size of the MW firms becomes stable after that.  Not surprisingly, the 
audit committees of the MW firms meet more frequently than their counterparts in the 
year of MW detection.  The differences in the audit committee frequency between the 
two groups of firms persist until the second year following the MW detection (p < 0.01, 
one-tailed).  
 
Turning to the full board characteristics, Panel B shows that the MW firms have 
less independent boards than the control firms in the year prior to the MW detection (p < 
0.01, one-tailed).  Although both the MW firms and control fi ms improve their board 
independence during the three-year period, the rate of improvement of board 
independence is faster for the MW firms.  In the year following the MW detection, the 
board independence of the MW firms and control firms is no longer significantly 
different.  The control firms expand their board size during the three-year period, but the 
board size of the MW firms is virtually unchanged during thisperiod.  Because a larger 
board size reduces effectiveness, this finding may suggest that board monitoring of the 
control firms actually deteriorate during this period.   
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The results on board meeting frequency are similar to those of audit committee 
meeting frequency.  Starting from the year of the MW detection, the boards of the MW 
firms meet more frequently than the boards of the control firms, and this result persists 
until the second year following the MW detection.  Last, the proportion of MW firms and 
control firms with a split CEO and Chairman positions increases during the three-year 
period.  In the second year following the MW detection, there is a significantly higher 
proportion of MW firms with split CEO and Chairman positions than the control firms (p 
< 0.05, one-tailed).  This result is consistent with the MW firms’ attempts to strengthen 
their corporate governance structure by splitting the CEO and Chairman positions upon 
the revelation of deficiencies in their internal contr l systems.  
 
Column 8 shows that overall, both the MW firms and control firms show 
significant improvements in their audit committee independence, audit committee 
accounting financial expertise, audit committee size, audit committee meeting frequency, 
board independence, board meeting frequency, and duality structure.  Column 7 further 
shows that the improvements in these governance characteristi s, with the exception of 
duality structure, are greater for the MW firms than for the control firms (p < 0.05, one-









Table 13: OLS regression results on the incidence of MW and improvement in 
overall governance structure 
 
CHANGE = a + b1MWF + b2STKPERF + b3ZFC + b4LGTA + b5MARESTR 
+b6RESTATE +b7LITIGATION + b8BLOCKOWN + 




Model 1 Model 2 
Variableb  Coefficient 
Estimates 
t-stats c Coefficient 
Estimates 
t-stats c 
Intercept ? 1.92 4.92*** 2.66 4.57*** 
MWF + 0.88 4.71***   
STKPERF + -0.046 -0.56 -0.0020 -0.02 
ZFC - -0.074 -0.19 -0.19 -0.37 
LGTA + 0.10 2.15** 0.050 0.72 
MARESTR + 0.27 1.74** 0.12 0.49 
RESTATE + -0.019 -0.10 -0.19 -0.70 
LITIGATION + -0.054 -0.36 0.17 0.78 
BLOCKOWN + 0.013 2.68*** 0.014 1.85* 
INSIDEOWN + -0.00092 -0.15 -0.0020 -0.18 
INSTOWN + 0.044 0.14 0.42 0.81 
SEVERE +   0.18 0.60 
PERVADE +   0.042 0.81 







***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests 
where signs are predicted, two-tailed tests otherwise. 
a The regression model is for Model 1 and the regression result is based on both the MW firms and control 
firms.  Model 2 replaces MWF with SEVERE, PERVADE, and PERSIST and the regression result is based 
on the MW firms.  
b See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables. The dependent variable in Model 1 is 
CHANGE, which is a composite measure of the overall improvement in governance structure 
(effectiveness of the audit committee and the board) of a firm.  








Model 1 of Table 13 shows the results of the OLS model which regresses 
CHANGE, the overall improvement in governance structure, on MWF, financial 
variables, and other external monitoring mechanism variables.  Consistent with 
expectations, MWF is positive and significant (p < 0.01, one-tailed), suggesting that the 
MW firms show greater overall improvement in their governance structures than the 
control firms.  Among the financial variables, LGTA and MARESTR are both positive 
and significant (p < 0.05, one-tailed), consistent with larger firms and firms that undergo 
mergers, acquisitions, or restructuring showing greater overall improvement in their 
governance structures.  Last, BLOCKOWN is positive and significant (p < 0.01, one-
tailed), providing support that large blockholders may have intensified the pressures for 
firms to improve their governance structures.  
 
In summary, the results in this section support Hypothesis 4 in that the MW firms 
show greater improvement in their audit committee independence, audit committee 
accounting financial expertise, audit committee size, and board independence than the 
control firms.  Using a composite measure to capture the overall improvement in the 
governance structures, I also find that the MW firms show greater overall improvement in 
the effectiveness of their audit committees and their boards than the control firms.  In the 
next section, I present the empirical results on whether the extent in which the MW firms 
improve their governance structures is contingent on the sev rity, pervasiveness, and 




Table 14: Descriptive statistics and univariate test results on the relation between the severity, pervasiveness, and persistence 
of MW and the improvement in governance structures 
***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests  
a SEVERE is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if the firm has one or more severe MW, and 0 otherwise.  Severe MW is defined in APPENDIX C.   
b PERVADE is the total number of different categories of MW that a MW firm has.  For the purpose of presenting he descriptive statistics, I classify the MW 
firms based on whether PERVADE is less than the median of ll MW firms, or greater than or equal to the median of all MW firms.  
c PERSIST is an indicator variable that is coded 1 if MW are not remediated within two years from the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.  
d See APPENDIX B for definitions of variables.  The prfix ∆ indicates the change in the governance variables from the year before the MW detection to the 
second year following the MW detection. 
e A two-sample t-test is used to test for significant differences in means between each sub-samples of firms.  
 
 
 Severity of MW (SEVERE)a Pervasiveness of MW (PERVADE) b Persistence of MW (PERSIST) c 













∆ACINDP 0.21 0.16 0.77 0.17 0.19 -0.30 0.11 0.20 -1.22 
∆ACCEXP 0.14 0.13 0.35 0.15 0.11 1.15 0.17 0.12 1.45* 
∆NONACCEXP -0.018 0.018 -0.97 0.0065 -0.0001 0.19 -0.002 0.0047 -0.15 
∆ACSIZE 0.22 0.21 0.12 0.19 0.23 -0.33** 0.21 0.21 0.04 
∆ACMEET 5.88 3.88 2.31***  5.78 3.58 2.76** 7.27 3.73 3.26***  
∆BDINDP 0.13 0.087 2.24** 0.12 0.097 0.91 0.13 0.097 1.47* 
∆BDSIZE -0.22 0.16 -1.43* -0.26 0.28 -2.08 -0.33 0.13 -1.56* 
∆BDMEET 2.06 1.75 0.35 2.04 1.72 0.38 3.09 1.42 1.49* 
∆DUALITY 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.29 0.078 0.14 -0.50 
CHANGE 4.19 3.79 1.88** 4.13 3.78 1.62** 4.29 3.82 1.95** 
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5.6 The Relation between the Severity, Pervasiveness, and Persistence of MW, and 
the Improvement in Governance Structure (Hypotheses 4a) 
Table 14 presents the descriptive statistics and univariate test results on the 
relation between the severity (SEVERE), pervasiveness (PERVADE), and persistence 
(PERSIST) of MW and the extent to which MW firms improve their governance 
structures.  The table shows how the changes in each of the governance variables differ in 
sub-samples of the MW firms classified based on the sev rity, pervasiveness, and 
persistence of MW.  The corporate governance changes are measured from the year 
before the MW detection to the second year following the MW detection.  A positive 
change for each variable indicates an improvement in that governance characteristic, 
except for BDSIZE, in which case a negative change indicates an improvement.  Just as 
before, CHANGE is the composite measure that captures the extent of improvement in all 
the nine audit committee and board characteristics, with hig er scores indicating a greater 
extent of improvement in overall governance structures. 
 
The results in Table 14 show that the audit committee mting frequency and 
board independence for firms that have one or more severe MW increase more over the 
three-year period than those of firms that do not have se re MW (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, 
respectively, one-tailed).  Consistent with expectations, there is some evidence that the 
board size decreases more for firms that have one or more severe MW (p < 0.10, one-
tailed).  Contrary to expectations, firms with more pervasive MW show lower increases 
in audit committee size than for firms with less pervasi e MW (p < 0.05, one-tailed).  
However, as predicted, firms with more pervasive MW show greater increases in audit 
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committee meeting frequency (p < 0.05, one-tailed).  There is also some empirical 
support that firms with more persistent MW show greater increases in audit committee 
accounting financial expertise (p < 0.10, one-tailed), audit committee meeting frequency 
(p < 0.01, one-tailed), board independence (p < 0.10, one-tailed), board meeting 
frequency (p < 0.10, one-tailed), and greater decreases in board size (p < 0.10, one-tailed) 
than firms with less persistent MW.  Last, the improvement in the overall governance 
structure, CHANGE, is significantly greater for firms with more severe, pervasive, and 
persistent MW (p < 0.05, one-tailed).  
 
Model 2 of Table 13 shows the regression results that more rigorously test the 
relation between the overall improvement in governance structure (CHANGE) and the 
severity, pervasiveness, and persistence of MW.  The variables SEVERE, PERVADE, 
and PERSIST are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Hence, although the 
univariate test results show that the overall improvement in governance structure is 
greater for firms with more severe, pervasive, and persist nt MW, these results do not 
hold in the regression model which control for other variables.   
 
Overall, there is little or no empirical evidence to support Hypothesis 4a that the 
extent of improvement in governance structure increases in the severity, pervasiveness, 
and persistence of MW.  Nevertheless, the results in the previous section provide strong 
empirical support that MW firms show greater extent of improvement in their overall 
governance structures upon MW detection than the control firms.  Such improvement in 
governance structures may be an attempt by the MW firms to restore investor confidence, 
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recover reputational capital, reduce legal liability, recover stock performance, etc.  If 
investors indeed believe that the improvement in governance structures will lead to better 
monitoring by the audit committee and the board, they are likely to have greater 
confidence in the firm’s financial reporting and react positively to such changes.  The 
next section presents the empirical results to test th  relation between the improvement in 
governance structures and the long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns.   
 
5.7 The Relation between Improvement in Governance Structures and Long-Run 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (Hypothesis 5) 
The results in the previous section show that the MW firms improve on some 
governance characteristics from the year before the MW detection to the second year 
following the MW detection, but not on others.  Hence, I focus my analyses in this 
section on those characteristics that show improvement: (1) audit committee 
independence, (2) audit committee accounting financial expertise, (3) audit committee 
size, (4) board independence, and (5) duality structure.  Althoug  audit committee and 
board meeting frequency both increase for the MW firms, I do not conduct analyses on 
these variables because the interpretation of an increase in these variables is not 
straightforward.  For instance, an increase in meeting frequency during this period may 
simply reflect the firms’ efforts toward meeting SOX 404 compliance and may not 
necessarily reflect a greater diligence or effectiveness on the firms’ audit committees and 
boards.  It is even possible that a greater meeting frequency may reflect potential internal 
control problems, which may not be perceived positively by capital market participants.  
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Panel A of Table 15 provides the descriptive statistics and univariate test results 
on the relation between the improvement in governance structures and the two-year buy-
and-hold abnormal returns.  Four measures of buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
presented and they are computed from the year before the MW detection to the year after 
the MW detection.  BHAR_EW, BHAR_VW, BHAR_SP, and BHAR_CTRL represent 
buy-and-hold returns computed relative to the CRSP equal-weighted index, CRSP value-
weighted index, CRSP S&P 500 index, and the control firms, espectively.  The buy-and-
hold abnormal returns are provided separately for the MW firms that experience a 
positive change in each governance characteristic, and for the MW firms that experience 









Table 15: The relation between the improvement in governance structures and two-year buy-and-hold abnormal returnsa  
 
        Panel A: Descriptive statistics and univariate test results 
Variableb Change from year t-1 to 
t+1 relative to the MW 
detection 
BHAR_EW c BHAR_VW c BHAR_SPc BHAR_CTRL c 
ACINDP Change > 0 (n=36) -0.025 0.33 0.45 -0.8 
 Change ≤ 0 (n=148) -0.17 0.14 0.25 -0.78 
 t-statisticsd 0.80 1.07 1.08 -0.07 
ACCEXP Change > 0 (n=79) -0.20 0.12 0.23 -0.90 
 Change ≤ 0 (n=105) -0.088 0.22 0.33 -0.70 
 t-statisticsd -0.84 -0.68 -0.67 -1.20 
ACSIZE Change > 0 (n=54) 0.070 0.37 0.48 -0.72 
 Change ≤ 0 (n=130) -0.22 0.099 0.21 -0.81 
 t-statisticsd 1.93** 1.72** 1.70** 0.54 
BDINDP Change > 0 (n=126) -0.095 0.24 0.35 -0.81 
 Change ≤ 0 (n=58) -0.23 0.042 0.15 -0.73 
 t-statisticsd 0.94 1.28* 1.30* -0.42 
DUALITY  Change > 0 (n=23) -0.15 0.12 0.23 -0.76 
 Change ≤ 0 (n=161) -0.13 0.19 0.29 -0.79 
 t-statisticsd -0.06 -0.32 -0.33 0.13 
         ***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 perc nt, and 10 percent levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests. 
             a Each of the abnormal return is measured from the year b fo e the MW detection to the year after the MW detection.  
             b See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables. 
             c BHAR_EW, BHAR_VW, BHAR_SP, and BHAR_CTRL represent buy-and-hold returns computed relative to the CRSP equal-weighted index, CRSP  
         value-weighted index, CRSP S&P 500 index, and the control firms, respectively.   
             d A two-sample t-test is used to test for significant differences in means between the MW firms that experience a positive change in each governance  
         characteristic and the MW firms that experience a z ro or negative change in each governance characteristi . 
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Table 15 (continued) 
    Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the regression of BHAR and governance structures 
Variablea Mean Std. Dev. Median First Quartile Third Quartile 
BHAR_EW -0.14 0.95 -0.44 -0.81 0.36 
BHAR_VW  0.18 0.98 -0.094 -0.53 0.61 
BHAR_SP 0.29 0.98 0.033 -0.42 0.71 
BHAR_CTRL -0.78 1.11 -0.81 -1.38 -0.057 
∆ACINDP 0.18 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
∆ACCEXP 0.098 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.25 
∆ACSIZE 0.22 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00 
∆BDINDP 0.094 0.17 0.067 0.00 0.17 
∆DUALITY -0.0054 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 
∆ROA 0.030 0.24 0.014 -0.030 0.077 
BMV -0.72 14.6 0.48 0.24 0.74 
MVE 5.97 1.52 5.82 4.95 6.93 
      a See APPENDIX B for definitions of variables. The prefix ∆ indicates the change in the governance variables from year t-1 to t+1. 
 
Panel C: Pearson correlation coefficients among independent variables 
Variablea ∆ACINDP  ∆ACCEXP ∆ACSIZE  ∆BDINDP ∆DUALITY  ∆ROA BMV  MVE  
∆ACINDP 1.00 0.077 0.028 0.35*** -0.12* -0.098 0.016 -0.11 
∆ACCEXP  1.00 -0.091 0.12 0.039 0.028 -0.19*** -0.015 
∆ACSIZE   1.00 -0.014 0.038 -0.0023 0.13* 0.042 
∆BDINDP    1.00 -0.010 -0.0053 0.038 -0.032 
∆DUALITY     1.00 0.13* 0.078 0.092 
∆ROA      1.00 -0.010 -0.20*** 
BMV       1.00 0.24*** 
MVE        1.00 
    ***, **, * Significant at less than 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively based on two-sided tests.
     a See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables. The prefix ∆ indicates the change in the governance variables from year t-1 to t+1. 
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The panel indicates that the MW firms that improve on audit committee 
independence generally experience greater BHAR than firms that do not.  However, the 
differences in the four measures of BHAR between the two groups are not statistically 
significant.  The panel also shows that the MW firms that improve the accounting 
financial expertise of their audit committees experience lower BHAR than the MW firms 
that do not, although the differences between the two groups are not statistically 
significant.  One possible reason for this counter-intuitive result is that the capital market 
participants may perceive the addition of accounting financial experts to the audit 
committees as an attempt by the firm to deal with potential or ongoing internal control 
problems.  As a result, the market penalizes the firms rather than reward them for such 
improvement.    
 
The panel further shows that the MW firms that increase audit committee size and 
board independence experience greater BHAR than the MW firms that do not, based on 
all measures of BHAR, except BHAR_CTRL in the case of board independence.  The 
difference in BHAR between the MW firms that increas udit committee size and MW 
firms that do not is significant based on all measures of BHAR except BHAR_CTRL (p < 
0.05, one-tailed).  The difference in BHAR between the MW firms that increase board 
independence and the MW firms that do not is marginally significant using BHAR_VW 
and BHAR_SP (p < 0.10, one-tailed).  Last, there is no evidence that the MW firms that 
split the CEO and Chairman positions experience greater BHAR than the MW firms that 
do not.   
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I more rigorously test the relation between the improvement in governance 
characteristics and BHAR using an OLS regression model.  Panel B of Table 15 provides 
the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression.  During the two-year 
period centered on the MW detection, the MW firms experience smaller BHR relative to 
the CRSP equal-weighted index and the control firms (BHAR_EW, BHAR_CTRL < 0).  
However, the MW firms experience greater BHR relative o the CRSP value-weighted 
index and CRSP S&P 500 index (BHAR_VW, BHAR_SP > 0).  Eighteen percent of the 
MW firms change from a non-fully independent audit committee to one that is fully 
independent.  On average, the MW firms add about one accounting fi ancial expert to 
their audit committees and increase the size of theiraudit committees by 0.22.  Board 
independence also increases by an average of about 0.10, and there is a net decrease in 
the number of firms that split the CEO and Chairman positions.  On average, the MW 
firms experience a three percentage points increase in th ir ROA during the period.  Last, 
the mean book-to-market value of the MW firms is -0.72 and the mean log of market 
value of the MW firms is 5.97. 
 
Panel C of Table 15 shows the Pearson correlations among the independent 
variables in the regression.  The correlation coeffici nts range from -0.20 (between 
∆ROA and MVE) to 0.35 (between ∆ACINDP and ∆BDINDP).  The VIFs of all the 




Table 16: OLS regression results on the relation between the improvement in governance structures and two-year buy-and-
hold abnormal returnsa  
 






(BHAR_EW)  a 
Model 2 




(BHAR_CTRL)  a 
Variable b  Coefficient  
Estimates 
t-statsc Coefficient  
Estimates 
t-statsc Coefficient  
Estimates 
t-statsc Coefficient  
Estimates 
t-statsc 
Intercept ? 0.54 1.81* 0.83 2.79*** 0.94 3.14*** -0.85 -2.38 
∆ACINDP + -0.072 -0.41 -0.035 -0.20 -0.034 -0.20 -0.091 -0.44 
∆ACCEXP + -0.26 -0.69 -0.30 -0.80 -0.30 -0.80 -0.35 -0.78 
∆ACSIZE + 0.17 1.86** 0.14 1.57* 0.14 1.55* 0.040 0.37 
∆BDINDP + 0.86 2.70*** 0.97 2.31** 0.98 2.33*** 0.50 0.99 
∆DUALITY  + -0.032 -0.55 -0.030 -0.36 -0.030 -0.36 -0.12 -1.14 
∆ROA + 0.91 2.72*** 1.04 3.55*** 1.05 3.57*** 1.41 4.00*** 
BMV ? 0.0093 2.81*** 0.0096 1.97** 0.0096 1.97** 0.0037 0.62 











***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests where signs are predicted, two-tailed tests otherwise.  
aEach of the abnormal return is measured from the year b fo e the MW detection to the year after the MW detection.  
b See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables.  The prefix ∆ indicates the change in the governance variables from the year before the MW 
detection to year after the MW detection. 
c The Breusch-Pagan test shows the presence of heteroskedasticity in Model 1. Hence, the t-statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity are computed for 




Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Table 16 show the regression results using BHAR_EW, 
BHAR_VW, BHAR_SP, and BHAR_CTRL, respectively.  The results based on the first 
three measures are similar but differ from those of BHAR_CTRL, in which none of the 
corporate governance change variables is significant.  In the models using the first three 
measures, the results are consistent with that of the univariate tests.  In all three models, 
∆ACSIZE is positive and significant (p < 0.05, one-tailed n Model 1, and p < 0.10, one-
tailed in Models 2 and 3).  In all three models, ∆BDINDP is also positive and significant 
(p < 0.01, one-tailed in Models 1 and 3, and p < 0.05, one-tailed in Model 2).  These 
results provide empirical support that the market values th increases in audit committee 
size and board independence.  The latter result is also consistent with Farber (2005) who 
finds a significant positive relation between the change i  board independence and long-
run buy-and-hold abnormal returns.   
 
The other corporate governance change variables are not statis ically significant at 
conventional levels in any of the models.  Consistent with expectations, the change in 
return on assets is positive and significant (p < 0.01, one-tailed).  Also, in all three 
models, the book-to-market value is positive and significant (p< 0.01, two-tailed in 
Model 1, and p < 0.05, two-tailed in Models 2 and 3) and the log of market value of 





Table 17: OLS regression results on the effect of the severity, pervasiveness, and persistence of MW on BHAR_EW 
 
BHAR  = a + b1 ∆ACSIZE + b2 ∆BDINDP + b3 SEVERE+ b4 PERVADE + b5 PERSIST + b6∆ACSIZE X SEVERE + 
b7∆ACSIZE X PERVADE + b8∆ACSIZE X PERSIST + b9∆ BDINDP X SEVERE + b10∆ BDINDP X PERVADE + 
b11∆ BDINDP X PERSIST + b12 ∆ROA + b13BMV+ b14MVE + ε 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




t-stats b Coefficient  
Estimates  
t-stats b Coefficient  
Estimates 
t-stats b 
Intercept ? 0.78 2.60*** 0.71 2.29** 0.72 2.31** 
∆ACSIZE + 0.054 0.34   0.052 0.33 
∆BDINDP +   0.76 1.11 0.75 1.10 
SEVERE ? 0.11 0.63 0.085 0.41 0.13 0.62 
PERVADE ? -0.048 -1.41 -0.038 -1.05 -0.051 -1.33 
PERSIST ? -0.095 -0.53 -0.16 -0.82 -0.18 -0.92 
∆ACSIZE X SEVERE + -0.0092 -0.04   -0.048 -0.21 
∆ACSIZE X PERVADE + 0.0048 0.12   0.010 0.26 
∆ACSIZE X PERSIST - 0.30 1.19   0.24 0.98 
∆BDINDP X SEVERE +   -0.37 -0.33 -0.40 -0.35 
∆BDINDP X PERVADE +   -0.048 -0.24 -0.036 -0.18 
∆BDINDP X PERSIST -   1.71 1.25 1.41 1.03 
∆ROA + 0.85 2.92*** 0.98 3.24*** 0.94 3.12*** 
BMV ? 0.0096 1.94* 0.010 2.14** 0.0093 1.86* 









***, **, * Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent leve s respectively, based on one-tailed tests where signs are predicted, two-tailed tests otherwise.  
a See APPENDIX B for definitions of independent variables.  The prefix ∆ indicates the change in the governance variables from the year before the MW 
detection to year after the MW detection. 
     b The Breusch-Pagan test does not show the presence of heteroskedasticity. Hence, the usual t-statistics are presented. 
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5.8 The Effect of the Severity, Pervasiveness, and Persistenc  of MW on the Relation 
between Improvement in Governance Structures and Long-Run Abnormal Returns 
(Hypotheses 5a) 
The results in the previous section show that improvements in audit committee 
size and board independence are positively associated with two-year BHAR, which is 
consistent with the market valuing the firm’s improvement in these governance 
characteristics.  In this section, I delve further into whether this positive market reaction 
is increasing in the severity and pervasiveness of the MW and decreasing in the 
persistence of the MW disclosed.  
 
Table 17 shows the regression results by further interacting SEVERE, 
PERVADE, and PERSIST with those governance variables in wh ch the improvements 
are positively related to BHAR in the previous section, .e. audit committee size and 
board independence.  Models 1 and 2 show the regression reults separately for audit 
committee size and board independence, and Model 3 shows the combined results of 
audit committee size and board independence in the same regression.  Because the results 
are the same using the three measures of BHAR, I tabulae only the results using 
BHAR_EW.  None of the interaction terms are significant in any of the three models and 
using any of the three measures.  Hence, Hypothesis 5a is not supported and there is no 
empirical evidence that the positive relation between th  improvement in audit committee 
size and board independence and long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns is increasing in 






6.1 Summary of Study Findings 
This study is motivated by the recent corporate scandals involving weak internal 
controls and the internal-controls reporting requirements of SOX.  The study examines 
the causes and consequences of MW reported under SOX 302.  The first objective is to 
shed light on the link between internal control quality and governance structures.  I 
expect less effective audit committees and boards of directors to result in lower quality 
internal control monitoring, which leads to a greater incidence of MW.  The results 
provide some empirical support for my expectations.  Specifically, in the year prior to the 
MW detection, I find that firms with a lower proportion f audit committee members 
with accounting financial expertise, smaller audit committees, and lower proportions of 
board members who are independent, are more likely to be associated with the incidence 
of MW.  There is also some evidence that firms with lower proportion of audit committee 
members with nonaccounting financial expertise are more likely to have MW.   
 
The second objective of the study is to examine the reputational penalties faced 
by the top management, audit committee members, and outside directors on the board for 
firms that report MW.  The empirical results are consistent with reputational penalties 
being imposed on these individuals for internal control failures.  Specifically, I find some 
evidence that the top management in MW firms experience turnover at a rate greater than 
their counterparts in the control firms after controlling for other factors that may affect 
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the turnover of these individuals, such as poor financial performance.   There is strong 
empirical support that the audit committee members and outside directors in the MW 
firms experience turnover at a rate greater than their counterparts in the control firms.  I 
also find that the audit committee members and outside directors of the MW firms lose 
more outside directorships in other public companies than their counterparts in the 
control firms.  This turnover of audit committee members and outside directors, and the 
loss in their outside directorships, further increase with the severity of the firm’s MW. 
 
The third objective of this study is to investigate the changes in governance 
structures of the MW firms from the year prior to the MW detection to the second year 
following the MW detection.  Examining whether the governance structures of the MW 
firms improve is important, given that these firms are more susceptible to fraud and/or 
financial statement errors.  Improvement in their governance structures can also be seen 
as tangible benefits accruing to stakeholders of weak firms that can potentially justify the 
high costs involved in the internal-controls reporting requirements of SOX.  The 
empirical results show that the MW firms show improvements in their audit committee 
independence, audit committee accounting financial expertise, audit committee size, and 
board independence, and these improvements exceed those of the c ntrol firms.  Using a 
composite measure to capture the overall improvement in governance structures, I also 
find that the MW firms show greater overall improvement in the effectiveness of their 
audit committees and their boards than the control firms.  In the second year following 
the MW detection, the MW firms and control firms no longer exhibit differences in their 
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audit committee independence, audit committee accounting financ al expertise, audit 
committee size, and board independence.   
 
The last objective of this study is to provide evidence on whether the 
improvements in governance structures help restore investor confidence in the firm’s 
financial reporting.  If investors perceive that tangible enefits result from the 
improvements in governance structures, then they are likely to reward the firms through a 
higher market valuation.  My results are consistent with this expectation.  I find a positive 
relation between the improvements in the audit committee size and board independence 
of the MW firms and the firms’ two-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  This result 
provides empirical support that the market believes that the increases in audit committee 
size and the board independence improve the firm’s financial reporting quality and 
reduce uncertainty in the firm’s accounting numbers.  Theresults are consistent with the 
internal-controls reporting requirements restoring investor confidence in financial 
reporting, which is fundamental in maintaining the stability of capital markets. 
 
6.2 Contributions of this Study 
This study makes several contributions.  First, this study ad s to the existing 
literature on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, such as the audit 
committee and board of directors.  Most notably, this study uses data from the post-SOX 
period, which is a clear distinction from most studies examining the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms in the pre-SOX period.  Because corporate governance 
mechanisms are likely to tighten subsequent to SOX, the post-SOX regime provides a 
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rich context to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and allow 
us to examine governance characteristics that may be further improved upon.  
 
Second, this study complements Krishnan (2005) who examines the relation 
between audit committee characteristics and internal control quality using a sample of 
firms that changed auditors and reported internal control problems from 1994 to 2000.  
Her study finds that independent audit committees and audit committees with financial 
expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal 
control problems. This study addresses some of the limitat ons in Krishnan (2005).  For 
instance, this study uses a more representative sample of firms that reported internal 
control weaknesses subsequent to SOX, instead of a restricted sample of firms that 
disclosed internal control problems around auditor changes as in Krishnan (2005).27  
Further, because audit committee characteristics are cor lated with board characteristics 
(Klein 2002a)28 and the board also has fiduciary duties in monitoring internal controls, 
this study examines how both audit committee and board effectiveness is associated wih 
the quality of internal controls.  Nevertheless, this study and Krishnan (2005) enhance 
                                               
 
 
27 Krishnan (2005) contends that this is one shortcoming that may affect the generalizability of the results 
of the study.  Auditor-change companies tend to be smaller in size than the general population of 
companies and are traded on the smaller stock exchanges.   
28 The effectiveness of the audit committee may depend on board characteristics.  For instance, Beasley and 
Salterio (2001) find that firms with strong board governance attributes are more likely to voluntarily form 
audit committees composed of members with relevant financial reporting and audit committee knowledge 
and experience.  Klein (2002a) also finds that audit committee independence increases with board size and 
board independence.  Last, the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees (1999) states that “audit committee performance relies on the practices and attitudes of the 
entire board.”  Hence, failure to control for board characteristics can potentially introduce an endogeneity 
problem in the regression results.   
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our understanding on the important roles both the audit committee and the board play in 
ensuring effective internal controls both in the pre-SOX and post-SOX period.   
 
Third, this study adds to the existing literature examining the reputational 
penalties faced by top management, audit committee members, and outside directors as a 
result of corporate failures.  Prior research has examined the reputational penalties faced 
by top management and board directors due to poor financial performance and fraud.  
However, research has not examined whether these individuals face similar penalties for 
internal control failures.  This study is the first to examine the reputational penalties 
resulting from internal control failures, a corporate f ilure that is perhaps more important 
than poor financial performance and often a precursor to fraud.  Examining the 
reputational penalties effects due to ineffective internal controls will provide evidence on 
the effectiveness of labor market penalties as a mechanism for ensuring sound internal 
control systems, which are important in achieving high financial reporting quality.  
 
Fourth, this study is one of the few studies that examines whether governance 
structures improve upon internal control failures.  While many studies look at whether 
top management or board directors are replaced as a result of poor financial performance, 
only one study, Farber (2005) looks at whether governance structures improve upon the 
revelation of fraud.  This study differs from Farber (2005) in that it looks at governance 
structure changes upon detection of internal control weaknesses, weaknesses that can 
result in less credible financial reporting.  Because the internal-controls reporting 
requirements involve huge costs for firms, opponents have been skeptical of its benefits.  
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Hence, evidence that firms with weak internal controls improve their governance 
structures will provide evidence that the requirement produces results that benefit the 
capital market as a whole.   
 
Last, this study examines whether the capital market perceives tangible benefits 
that result from the improvement in governance structures.  Findings of a positive stock 
market reaction to these corporate governance improvements provide some support of a 
second order effect that the internal-controls reporting requirements restore investor 
confidence towards financial reporting.  This result is fundamental to achieving a sound 
financial market, which has been shaken in recent years.   
 
6.3 Limitations of this Study 
 The study is subject to limitations.  First, the stati ical power of the various tests 
performed may be low due to the small sample of 184 MW firms.  While the small 
sample size strengthens the statistic power of variables found to be significant, it works 
against finding statistically significant results for others.   Second, the final sample is 
obtained after the exclusion of many firms due to various rea ons, e.g., non-accelerated 
filers, securities registration termination, delays in the filings of 10-Ks, weaknesses dated 
too far back, no proxy statements, etc.  It is not clear how the exclusion of these firms 
may affect the results in this study.  Third, 31 out of the 184 sample firms (16.8%) are 
matched based on the one-digit SIC code.  Hence, the matching based on industry is not 
perfect.  This limitation mainly results from using several criteria in the matching process 
(e.g. sales, exchange listing, industries, accelerated filer status), and that many firms 
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either went private or failed to file their 10-Ks under the new SOX requirements, which 
makes the pool of control firms more limited.  Nevertheless, this limitation is mitigated 
by the fact that only 16.8% of the firms are matched based on one-digit SIC, and that 102 
firms (55.4%) are matched based on four-digits.  Further, if anything, the imperfect 
matching only adds more noise to the regression results, making it more difficult to reject 
the null hypotheses.   
 
 Fourth, this is a study of association, not causation. There is a possibility that 
unobserved factors that are correlated with both the depen nt variables and independent 
variables of the various hypotheses drive the findings. For instance, there could be 
unobserved factors correlated with both internal control quality and the corporate 
governance characteristics (in the model used to test Hypothesis 1) that drive the results. 
This problem is mitigated by adding various control variables that are found to affect 
internal control quality in the extant literature (Ashbaugh et al. 2006a, Doyle et al. 
2007a).  Fifth, the proxies used to capture the effectiveness of the audit committee and 
the board may be crude.  For instance, the number of meetings is used to capture the 
diligence of the audit committee and the board.  However, th  diligence is also dependent 
on the duration of each meeting and this information is not publicly available.  
 
 Sixth, although the findings show evidence of reputational penalties imposed on 
the top management, audit committee members, and outside directors in the MW firms, 
we do not know why turnover occurs.  For instance, it is posible that these individuals 
leave the firms voluntarily in order to avoid being sued by shareholders for internal 
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control failures, rather than being ousted by the firm.  Although it would be good to know 
the underlying reason for these individuals leaving the firms, such information is often 
not publicly disclosed, preventing a stronger test of reputation l penalties.  
 
 Seventh, the results on the improvement in governance structure should be 
interpreted with caution.  Although the MW firms improve more in their governance 
structures than the control firms (consistent with the detection of MW providing the 
impetus for these firms to improve their governance structu es), it is possible that this 
result could be due to “ceiling effects,” in which the contr l firms started out having 
strong governance structures and have less room for improvements.  However, this 
problem is mitigated because the descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that there is still 
room for improvement in the governance structures of the control firms.  Further, the 
control firms should also have adequate incentives to improve their governance structures 
in the wake of recent accounting scandals and the passage of SOX.   One argument that 
strengthens the results in Hypothesis 4 is that if the MW firms started out as having weak 
governance structures, they should also have a greater tndency to remain weak in 
general and snub the improvement of governance structure.  This self-selection in the 
choice of MW firms thus works against finding positive results for Hypothesis 4.   
 
6.4 Directions for Future Study 
There are many avenues for future study.   First, this study focuses on MW 
disclosed under SOX 302.  Future research can examine whether the same results hold 
for MW disclosed under SOX 404, especially on the impact of MW disclosed under SOX 
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404 on the governance structures.   Because SOX 404 internal control assessments are 
more likely to be scrutinized by regulators and investors, the det ction of MW under 
SOX 404 should provide even greater incentives for firms to improve their governance 
structures.    
 
Second, this study focuses on accelerated filers.  These firms are subject to early 
SOX 404 reporting and have greater pressures to improve their gove nance structures.  
Hence, the choice of these firms provides a stronger test of the various hypotheses in this 
study.  Future research can examine whether non-accelerated filers, which are required to 
comply with SOX 404 at a later date, impose similar reputational penalties on those 
individuals charged with internal control monitoring, and face similar incentives to 
improve their governance structures as the accelerated filers.   
 
Third, this study only examines the reputational penalties imposed on top 
management, audit committee members, and outside directors for internal control 
failures.  Future research can examine whether other individuals, who also have 
responsibility in internal controls, face similar reputational penalties.  An example would 
be to examine whether Chief Financial Officers or Chief Accounting Officers experience 
such turnover when MW are detected.  Further, future resea ch can examine whether top 
management loses key positions in other companies or is relegat d to lower positions in 
other companies as a form of reputational penalties.   
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Last, this study only examines one impact of the improvement in governance 
structures, that is, the long-run abnormal returns.  Future research can examine the capital 
market impact of improvement in governance structures in other areas, such as the cost of 
equity or the cost of debt.   A reduction in the cost of equity or cost of debt following the 
improvement in governance structures would also be consiste t with investor confidence 
in the firm’s financial reporting being restored.   Alternatively, researchers may also be 
interested to find out whether the improvement in governance structures brings about an 
















SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with weaker corporate governance structures, i.e. less effective audit 
committees and boards of directors, are more likely to have MW.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with MW experience greater turnover f audit committee members 
and outside directors following the MW detection, compared to firms without internal 
control weaknesses.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Audit committee members and outside directors in firms with MW lose 
more outside directorships in other public companies following the MW detection, 
compared to their counterparts in firms without internal control weaknesses.  
 
Hypothesis 2c: Firms with MW experience greater turnover f top managers, i.e. CEO, 
Chairman, or President, compared to firms without internal control weaknesses.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with more severe, pervasive, and persistent MW experience greater 




Hypothesis 3b: Audit committee members and outside directors of firms with more 
severe, pervasive, and persistent MW lose more directorships in other firms following the 
MW detection.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Corporate governance structures, i.e., effctiveness of the audit committees 
and boards of directors, of the MW firms improve upon the MW detection, when 
compared to the control firms.   
 
Hypothesis 4a: For firms with MW, improvement in corporate governance structures, i.e., 
effectiveness of the audit committees and boards of directo s, is increasing in the 
severity, pervasiveness, and persistence of the MW.     
 
Hypothesis 5: For firms with MW, improvement in corporate governance structures, i.e., 
effectiveness of the audit committees and boards of directo s, results in a positive long-
run buy-and-hold abnormal returns.     
 
Hypothesis 5a: For firms with MW, the positive effect of improvement in corporate 
governance structures, i.e., effectiveness of the auditcommittees and boards of directors, 
on long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns is (1) greater wh n the MW are more severe 








Variables Expected  
Sign 
Definition  
Variables in the model examining the incidence of MW (Hypothesis 1) 
MWF N.A. An indicator variable that is coded 1 for firms with 
MW, and 0 for control firms.  
Corporate governance variables 
ACINDP - An indicator variable that equals 1 if the audit 
committee consists of fully independent members, 
and 0 otherwise.  
ACCEXP - The proportion of audit committee members with 
accounting financial expertise, i.e., experience as a 
public accountant, auditor, principal or chief financial 
officer, controller, or chief accounting officer. 
NONACCEXP - The proportion of audit committee members with
nonaccounting financial expertise, i.e., experience as 
a CEO, president, general partner, or managing 
director of a for-profit corporation. 
ACSIZE - The number of audit committee members. 
ACMEET - The number of times the audit committee meets p r 
year. 
BDINDP - The proportion of the board members who are 
independent. 
BDSIZE + The number of total board members. 
BDMEET - The number of times the board meets per year. 
DUALITY - An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO and 
Chairman of the board positions are held by different 
individuals, and 0 otherwise. 
BLOCKOWN - The percentage of stock held by blockholders in the 
firm. 
INSIDEOWN - The total percentage of stock held by management 
and directors. 
INSTOWN - The total percentage of stock held by all institutional 
owners of the firm. 
Financial variables 
LGTA - The log of the total assets of the firm (data item #6 of 
Compustat).  
ZFC + The financial distress measure, calculated from the 
probit coefficients of Zmijewski (1984). Greater 
values of ZFC indicate higher levels of distress 
present in the firm. 
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Variables Expected  
Sign 
Definition  
SEGMENTS + The number of operating segments of the firm as 
reported by Compustat segment file. 
 
FOREIGN + An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports 
a non-zero foreign currency translation (Compustat 
item #150), and 0 otherwise. 
MARESTR + An indicator variable that is coded 1 if restruc uring 
charges (data item #376) are reported in Compustat, 
or the AFTNT1 file in Compustat indicates the 
presence of a merger and acquisition, and 0 
otherwise. 
GROWTH + The sales growth defined as current year’s sale (data 
item #12) less prior year sales, scaled by prior year 
sales.  
LITIGATION - An indicator variable that is coded 1 if the firm 
operates in industries with SIC codes of 2833-2836 
(biotechnology), 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 
(computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), and 5200-6961 
(retailing), and 0 otherwise. 
Additional variables for Hypotheses 2a and 2c 
MGTTURNOVE
R 
N.A. An indicator variable that is coded 1 if any individual 
holding the title of CEO, Chairman, and/or President 
in the year before the MW detection, leaves the firm 
within two years of the MW detection, and 0 
otherwise.   
ACTURNOVER N.A. The proportion of audit committee members in the 
year before the MW detection who leave the firm 
within two years of the MW detection, and 0 
otherwise.   
ACTURNOVER1 N.A. An indicator variable that is coded 1 if at least one 
audit committee member in the year before the MW 
detection leaves the firm within two years of the MW 
detection, and 0 otherwise.   
ACTURNOVER2 N.A. An indicator variable that is coded 1 if at least half of 
the audit committee members in the year before the 
MW detection leave the firm within two years of the 
MW detection, and 0 otherwise.   
ACTURNOVER3 N.A. An indicator variable that is coded 1 if more than half 
of the audit committee members in the year before 
the MW detection leave the firm within two years of 
the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.   
BDTURNOVER N.A. The proportion of outside directors in the year before 
the MW detection who leave the firm within two 
years of the MW detection, and 0 otherwise.   
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Variables Expected  
Sign 
Definition  
BDTURNOVER1 N.A. An indicator variable that is coded 1 if at least one 
outside director in the year before the MW detection 
leaves the firm within two years of the MW 
detection, and 0 otherwise.   
BDTURNOVER2 N.A. An indicator variable that is coded 1 if at least half of 
the outside directors in the year before the MW 
detection leave the firm within two years of the MW 
detection, and 0 otherwise.   
 
BDTURNOVER3 N.A. An indicator variable that is coded 1 if more than half 
of the outside directors in the year before the MW 
detection leave the firm within two years of the MW 
detection, and 0 otherwise.   
STKPERF - The raw buy-and-hold returns over the month -12 to 
+12 relative to the MW detection. 
RESTATE + An indicator variable that is coded 1 if a firm 
announces one or more earnings restatements from 
the year before the MW detection to the second year 
after the MW detection.   
MGTAGE + The mean age of the individuals holding the positions 
of CEO, Chairman, and President.   
MGTTENURE - The mean tenure of the individuals holding the 
positions of CEO, Chairman, and President.   
ACAGE + The mean age of the audit committee members.  
ACTENURE - The mean tenure of the audit committee members. 
BDAGE + The mean age of the outside directors.  
BDTENURE - The mean tenure of the outside directors. 
Additional variables for Hypothesis 2b 
ACSEATLOSS N.A. The mean number of outside directorships in other 
public companies lost by the audit committee 
members from the year before the MW detection to 
the second year following the MW detection. 
BDSEATLOSS N.A. The mean number of outside directorships in other 
public companies lost by the outside directors from 
the year before the MW detection to the second year 
following the MW detection. 
ACSEATBEF + The mean number of outside directorships in other 
public companies held by the audit committee 
members in the year before the MW detection. 
BDSEATBEF + The mean number of outside directorships in other 
public companies held by the outside directors in the 




Variables Expected  
Sign 
Definition  
ACSEATAFT N.A. The mean number of outside directorships in other 
public companies held by the audit committee 
members in the second year following the MW 
detection. 
BDSEATAFT N.A. The mean number of outside directorships in other 
public companies held by the outside directors in the 
second year following the MW detection. 
Additional variables for Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
SEVERE + An indicator variable that is coded 1 if the firm has 
one or more severe MW, and 0 otherwise.  Severe 
MW is defined in APPENDIX C.   
 
 
PERVADE + The total number of different categories of MW that 
a MW firm has.  The different categories of MW are 
detailed in APPENDIX C.   
PERSIST + An indicator variable that is coded 1 if MW are not 
remediated within two years of the MW detection, 
and 0 otherwise.   
Additional variables for Hypotheses 4 and 4a 
CHANGE N.A. A composite measure of the overall improvement in 
audit committee and board characteristics. A firm is 
assigned a score of 1 for each positive change in 
governance characteristic from the year before the 
MW detection to the second year following the MW 
detection, except for board size, in which a score of 1 
is assigned for a negative change.  The individual 
scores are then summed up to obtain the composite 
score of improvement in governance structure, 
CHANGE.  Higher values indicate a greater overall 
improvement in governance structure.   
Additional variables for Hypotheses 5 and 5a 
BHR N.A. The two-year buy-and-hold return measured from 
months -12 to +12 relative to the MW detection.  
Measured the same way as STKPERF. 
BHAR N.A. The two-year buy-and-hold abnormal return 
measured from months -12 to +12 relative to the MW 
detection.  
BHAR_EW N.A. The BHR of the MW firms less the BHR of the 
CRSP equal-weighted index over the same period.  
BHAR_VW N.A. The BHR of the MW firms less the BHR of the 
CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. 
BHAR_SP N.A. The BHR of the MW firms less the BHR of the 
CRSP S&P 500 index over the same period. 
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Variables Expected  
Sign 
Definition  
BHAR_CTRL N.A. The BHR of the MW firms less the BHR of the 
control firms over the same period. 
CGVAR +/- The vector of governance variables that exhibit 
improvement from the year before the MW detection 
to the year after the MW detection. 
∆ROA + The change in return on assets from the year before 
the MW detection to the year after the MW detection. 
BMV ? The book value per share divided by the market value 
per share of the MW firm in the year before the MW 
detection. 
MVE ? The log of the market value of equity of the MW firm 
in the year before the MW detection.  
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APPENDIX C 
CATEGORIES OF MATERIAL WEAKNESSES 
 
Severe MW 
Ethical or compliance issues with personnel 
Board, audit committee, corporate governance issues 
Insufficient or non-existent internal audit function 
Management/board/audit Committee investigation, internal investigation evident/noted 
Ineffective regulatory compliance issues 
Senior management competency, tone, reliability issues, and/or self-dealing issues 
SEC or other regulatory investigations and/or inquiries 
Insufficient management review, inadequate control procedures 
 
Non-Severe MW 
Failure in the application of accounting rules 
Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedures 
Accounting personnel resources, competency/training 
Inadequate disclosure controls (timely, accuracy, completeness) 
Information technology, software, security & access isue  
Period-end closing & non-routine adjustment issues 
Segregations of duties/ design of controls 
Untimely or inadequate account reconciliations 
Acquisition - integration and/or challenges noted 
 151 
Audit opinion/consent/registration issues 
Company size, financial constraints, other limiting issue 
Event (8Ks, Form 4s etc.) disclosure issues 
Financial closing process/ policy/information accumulation & timeliness issues 
Financial records controlled in part or wholly by third party 
Non-standard or non-financial closing processing issues 
Proforma information disclosures inadequate 
Unspecified disclosure control deficiencies 
 
Note: I did not include the following categories in determining the different types of 
categories of MW because these categories do not actually describe the nature of the 
MW: remediation of material weakness identified, restatement of previous 404 
disclosures, (disclaimer of opinion) or other limitations, revision made later to these 
302/404 disclosures, Section 404 adverse report (recent past/pending) filed, and 
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